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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Little v. Spaeth
In Little v. Spaeth, I Little and Dietz, former assistant attorneys
general, appealed from a partial summary judgment dismissing
most of their claims arising from the termination of their
employment by Attorney General Nicholas Spaeth. 2 Little and
Dietz claimed that pursuant to the North Dakota Personnel Policies
Manual, they had a contract of employment with the attorney
general's office which required cause before they could be fired
from their positions.3 On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial
court erred in dismissing their claims based on the alleged contract
of employment.
4
The supreme court indicated that the personnel policies relied
upon by the plaintiffs were not binding on Spaeth because they had
not been submitted to the attorney general for an opinion prior to
their adoption and were not published in the North Dakota
Administrative Code. 5 Furthermore, the court stated that there was
no evidence that Spaeth had ever "voluntarily operated" under the
policies in the personnel manual. 6 Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiffs did not have a contractual right to employment with
1. 394 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1986).
2. Little v. Spaeth, 394 N.W.2d 700, 701-02 (N.D. 1986). Little and Dietz alleged five general
causes of action: (1) political firing; (2) violation of their first amendment rights to free speech; (3).
deprivation of their property rights without due process of law in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments; (4) breach of contract; and (5) defamation. Id. at 701. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the State and Spaeth, dismissing all the causes of action except those
not arising out of contract in the first and second causes of action against the attorney general
personally. Id. at 702.
3. Id. at 703. Chapter 8 of the North Dakota Personnel Policies Manual provided that the
appointing authority could dismiss an employee for inefficiency, insubordination, misconduct, or
other cause, and that the reasons for the dismissal were to be submitted to the employee in writing.
Id. Little and Dietz claimed that according to the North Dakota Supreme Court's holding in a prior
case, the manual constituted a contract of employment between the State and its classified employees
and the procedure therein must be followed. Id.; see Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd.,
345 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1984) (provisions of the manual under which the parties voluntarily
operated provided standard under which employee firing must be reviewed).
4. 394 N.W.2d at 702.
5. Id. at 704; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-32-02 (Supp. 1987)(every rule proposed by any
administrative agency must be submitted to the attorney general for an opinion as to its legality
before final adoption); id. 5 28-32-03(1) (rules not published in the administrative code are invalid).
6. 394 N.W.2d at 704. The supreme court noted that in Hammond, the court based its holding on
the fact that the employer in that case had held out that the personnel policies in the manual would be
followed. Id.; see Hammond, 345 N.W.2d at 361. Justice VandeWalle specially concurred in Little to
explain why Hammond did not apply to this case. Little, 394 N.W.2d at 707-08 (VandeWalle, J.,
specially concurring). Justice VandeWalle noted that in Little, Spaeth had only been in office for one
day before dismissing the plantiffs. Id. at 707. Unlike the situation in Hammond, there was no
evidence that the employer had held out that the policies in the manual were to be applied to this
employment relationship, or even that the plaintiffs would continue to be employed by Spaeth. Id.;
see Hammond, 345 N.W.2d at 361 (employer held out that the manual policies applied to the
employment relationship).
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the state and that they were not deprived of their property rights
when they were fired without cause.7
In addition, the supreme court upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation clairfi, because it determined
that the dismissals themselves were not defamatory, and that the
statements made by Spaeth in regard to the dismissals were also not
defamatory pursuant to North Dakota law. 8 Therefore, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's partial summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. 9
Nielsen v. Cass County Social Services Board
In Nielsen v. Cass County Social Services Board, 10 the Department
of Human Services (Department) appealed from a district court
judgment reversing the Department's decision to terminate Olson's
medical assistance benefits.II Olson was to inherit $23,000 through
intestate succession. 12 However, she subsequently renounced her
inheritance. 13  The Department determined that Olson's
inheritance prior to the renunciation constituted a property right
and, thus became an available resource which disqualified her from
receiving further benefits.14 In addition, when Olson renounced
her interest in the estate, the Department concluded that the
renunciation amounted to a transfer of property which also
7. 394 N.W.2d at 704. The court indicated that the plaintiffs' federal constitutional claim to
deprivation of property depended on whether the plaintiffs had a property right in continued
employment. Id.; see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)(federal
constitutional claim depends on respondents having had a property right in continued employment).
8. 394 N.W.2d at 705-06. The court held that the dismissals themselves were not defamatory
because it could not be inferred that they were based on cause, due to the fact that the attorney
general was not restricted to firing employees only for cause. Id. at 705. In regard to the alleged
defamatory statements made by the attorney general, the court held that they were not fairly
susceptible to defamatory meaning, and did not subject the plaintiffs to the disparagement
contemplated by North Dakota law defining defamation. Id. at 706; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-02-03
(1981) (publication which exposes person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided or which had a tendency to injure him in his occupation); id. 5 14-02-
04(3) (publication which tends to injure in respect to person's profession by imputing to him general
disqualifications in those respects which the profession peculiarly requires). Additionally, a
statement made by the attorney general after the complaint was filed, which explained his actions in
the matter, was found by the supreme court to have been privileged because the statement was made
in proper discharge of his duties as attorney general. Little, 394 N.W.2d at 706; see N.D. CENT. CODE
14-02-05(1) (1981) (communication made in the proper discharge of an official duty is privileged).
9. 394 N.W.2d at 707. The supreme court's decision to uphold the district court's partial
summary judgment did not dispose of plaintiffs' cause of action because the plaintiffs' claims of
political firing and first amendment violations of their right to free speech were not dismissed by the
district court. Id. at 708.
10. 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986).
11. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 158 (N.D. 1986).
12. Id.
13. Id. Olson renounced the inheritance through her conservator. Id.
14. Id. The Department based its decision on a determination that Olson's inheritance was a
property right and, therefore, the available resource disqualified her pursuant to section 50-24.1-02
of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02 (Supp. 1987) (generally
requiring recipients to use resources available to them prior to receiving benefits).
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disqualified her from further benefits. 15 The issue on appeal was
whether Olson's inheritance constituted an available resource, or
whether the renunciation was a transfer of property disqualifying
her from receiving further medical assistance benefits. 
16
The supreme court stated that the effect of a renunciation is to
treat the interest renouned as though it never passed to the renoun-
cing party because the renouncing party is deemed to have prede-
ceased the decedent.I7 Furthermore, the court noted that absent an
express statutory provision to the contrary, a renunciation is not
treated as a fraudulent transfer of assets regardless of the renoun-
cer's motive.' Finally, since neither Olson's creditors nor the tax
authorities could treat the renunciation as a transfer, the court was
unpersuaded that the Department should be allowed to treat the
renunciation as an act disqualifying her from receiving medical
assistance benefits. 19 Therefore, the supreme court held that
Olson's renunciation of her inheritance did not disqualify her from
receiving medical assistance benefits and, accordingly, affirmed the
district court decision. 20
Holen v. Hjelle
In Holen v. Hjelle, 21 the North Dakota Highway Commissioner
(Commissioner) appealed from a district court judgment reversing
an administrative suspension of Holen's driver's license.2 2 Holen
pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol and was convicted in a Montana court.23 The
Montana licensing authority subsequently suspended Holen's
15. 395 N.W.2d at 158; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 50-24.1-02(1) (Supp. 1987)(transfer of property
disqualifies recipient from receiving benefits).
16. 395 N.W.2d at 159.
17. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 30.1-10-01(3) (Supp. 1987) (providing that property or interests
renounced devolve as though the person renouncing predeceased the decedent). Subsection three of
section 30.1-10-01 provides that the renunciation relates back for all purposes to the date of the death
of the decedent or donee of the power. Id.
18. 395 N.W.2d at 159.
19. Id. at 160. The court noted that the legislature did not expressly provide that a renunciation
was a disqualifying act. Id. However, the legislature did provide an adequate tool to prevent an
unjust result by authorizing that one's renunciation rights could be barred by written waiver. Id.
20. Id. Justice VandeWalle dissented from the majority's determination that Olson was eligible
for medical assistance benefits. Id. (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). Justice VandeWalle stated that the
legislature enacted section 50-24.1-02(1) of the North Dakota Century Code to prevent a person from
purposely becoming impoverished in order to obtain medical assistance at the taxpayer's expense.
Id. at 161; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 50-24.1-02(1) (Supp. 1987) (providing that medical assistance is
available to any impoverished person who has not made a transfer of property for the purpose of
rendering himself eligible for assistance). Justice VandeWalle concluded that Olson's inheritance
rendered her ineligible to receive medical assistance under section 50-24.1-02(1). Id. at 162.
Therefore, Justice VandeWalle would have reversed the decision of the district court. Id.
21. 396 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1986).




driving privileges in Montana, and a photostatic copy of that
administrative action and the conviction were forwarded to the
Commissioner. 24 The Commissioner suspended Holen's license
pursuant to section 39-06.1-10 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 25 The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the definition of a
"conviction" pursuant to section 39-06-30 of the North Dakota
Century Code included Holen's conviction in Montana; (2)
whether the uncertified copy of Holen's conviction was sufficient
evidence to suspend his driver's license; and (3) whether the
administrative hearing deprived Holen of due process since he was
not represented or advised of his right to counsel in the Montana
proceeding.26
The supreme court looked to the intent of the legislature to
determine the proper interpretation of the word "conviction." '27
The court noted that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the
use of convictions in sister states for license suspensions in North
Dakota. 28 Accordingly, the court held that proper interpretation of
the word "conviction" for purposes of section 39-06-27 is a final
order or judgment by the supreme court of a sister state or any
lower court of that state, provided that no appeal is pending and
that the time for filing a notice of appeal has elapsed. 29 Therefore,
the court concluded that Holen's conviction in Montana
constituted a conviction for purposes of section 39-06-27.30
In addition, the court held that the uncertified copy of the
Montana conviction was sufficient evidence to suspend Holen's
license since the suspension was predicated on a conviction in
another state rather than on an administrative decision in another
state. 31  Furthermore, the supreme court rejected Holen's
contention that the use of the Montana conviction as a basis for
increasing the length of his license suspension violated his due
24. Id.
25. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10 (1987) (providing enhanced suspension provisions).
The Commission notified Holen of its intent to suspend his North Dakota driver's license. 396
N.W.2d at 291. At the administrative hearing, the Commissioner suspended Holen's license for 385
days over his objections to the admission of copies of the Montana conviction, the license suspension,
and of his driving record. Id.
26. Id. at 291, 293, 294; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-30 (1987) (meaning and effect of the term
conviction).
27. 396 N.W.2d at 293.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-27 (1987) (providing that the Commissioner may suspend
the license of a resident to drive a motor vehicle upon receiving notice of the conviction of such
person in another state).
30. 396 N.W.2d at 291.
31. Id. at 293; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-32(7) (1987)(photostatic copies of records of
licensing authorities of another state shall be sufficient evidence of the conviction).
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process rights. 32  Holen had asserted that his uncounselled
conviction could not be used to enhance penalties imposed against
him. 33 The supreme court recognized that penalties cannot be
enhanced from an uncounselled conviction in a criminal action.
34
However, the court stated that a license suspension is a civil
proceeding involving the exercise of police power to protect the
public, and that it is not imposed for purposes of punishment.
35
Therefore, since Holen's license suspension was not a criminal
action, the court held that his due process rights were not violated




In Wall v. Lewis,37 the plaintiff physicians appealed from a
district court judgment dismissing their action against Lewis for
legal malpractice. 38  Between 1969 and 1971, the plaintiffs
employed Lewis to prepare trust agreements designed to shield
medical partnership income from taxation. 39 Subsequently, the
Internal Revenue Service audited the plaintiffs' partnership returns
for the years 1972 and 1973, and in 1977, issued deficiency notices
to the plaintiffs.40 The plaintiffs then consulted a tax attorney to
review the various options available to them regarding the
deficiency notice, and were informed that they had a potential
malpractice claim against Lewis.41  After consulting the tax
attorney, the plaintiffs again sought Lewis' advice regarding the
legality of the trust agreements.42 Lewis maintained that the trusts
were properly drafted and advised the plaintiffs to sue in federal
court to have the IRS assessments overturned.
43
32. 396 N.W.2d at 295.
33. Id. at 294. Holen relied on State v. Orr, which held that uncounselled convictions could not be
used to enhance penalties for subsequent convictions. Id.; see State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178-79
(N.D. 1985).
34. 396 N.W.2d at 294.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 294-95. The court declined to extend the rationale of Orr to a civil license suspension
proceeding. Id.; see State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178-79 (1987) (uncounselled convictions cannot
be used to enhance penalties for subsequent convictions).
37. 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1986).





43. Id. Lewis agreed to represent the physicians and to waive his fee if the assessments were not
overturned. Id.
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In January 1979, Lewis took office as a county judge and in
July of that same year, he arranged to have another attorney,
Gerald Rufer, sue the IRS in federal district court on behalf of the
physicians. 44 In 1981, a federal district court decided in favor of the
IRS. 45 Consequently, on September 9, 1983, the plaintiffs com-
menced separate malpractice actions against Lewis which were
consolidated by stipulation.4 6 The trial court concluded that the
two-year malpractice statute of limitations had already expired
when the plaintiffs sued Lewis in September 1983.47 Therefore, the
trial court entered summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs'
claims, and the plaintiffs appealed.
48
The supreme court noted that the two-year statute of
limitations in legal malpractice actions commences to run when the
plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know of (1) the
injury, (2) its cause, and (3) the defendant's possible negligence.4
9
The court determined that in this case, the plaintiffs had discovered
the injury, its cause, and Lewis' possible negligence when the tax
attorney informed them of their potential malpractice claim. 50 The
court then considered the plaintiffs' contention that the statute of
limitations was tolled during the period that Lewis continued to
represent them. 51  The court noted that the continuous
representation rule has been adopted in some jurisdictions to toll
the statute of limitations for malpractice. 52 Furthermore, the court
recognized that the continuous representation rule protects the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship and affords the attorney
an opportunity to remedy his or her error, while simultaneously
preventing the attorney from defeating the client's cause of action
through delay. 53 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was
44. Id. Lewis agreed to pay Rufer's legal fees. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The trial court considered both the discovery rule and the representative rule, and
concluded that the plaintiffs should have discovered the injury, its cause, and Lewis' possible
negligence by September 1977. Id. Therefore, the court determined that Lewis' representation of the
plaintiffs ceased onJanuary 1, 1979, when he took judicial office. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 761; see Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471, 473 (N.D. 1985)(statute of limitations
commences when plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know of the injury, its cause,
and defendant's possible negligence); Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448, 449
(N.D. 1983) (same). The court stated that the focus of this "discovery rule" is whether the plaintiff
has been apprised of facts which would place a reasonable person on notice that a potential claim
exists. 393 N.W.2d at 761.
50. 393 N.W.2d at 762.
51. Id.
52. ld. The court stated that the continuous representation rule tolls the statute of limitations or
defers accrual of the cause of action while the attorney continues to represent the client and the
representation relates to the same transaction or subject matter as the allegedly negligent acts. Id.
53. Id. at 763.
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appropriate to apply the continuous representation rule in legal
malpractice actions in North Dakota. 54 However, since the parties
failed to focus upon the continuous representation theory, the
supreme court remanded the case with directions that the parties be
afforded an opportunity to further develop their respective
positions on the issue of whether Lewis' representation continued
into the two year period prior to September 9, 1983.55
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Napoleon Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Rohrich
In Napoleon Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Rohrich,56 Napoleon
Livestock Auction (Napoleon) appealed from a district court order
denying Napoleon's motions for a new trial and for an amendment
of its complaint. 57 Napoleon also appealed from a subsequent order
that awarded partial attorney's fees and expenses to one of the
defendants, Clemens Rohrich.5 8 On November 23, 1983, Clemens'
son, Pius, and Napoleon entered into an agreement by which
Napoleon issued a $257,000 check to Pius as an advance for the
purchase of approximately 700 calves that Pius was to deliver to
Napoleon within two weeks. 59 Pius then brought the check to the
First National Bank of Linton (Bank) and allowed the Bank to
deposit the check against his debt. 60  However, Pius did not
relinquish possession of the calves and Napoleon did not demand
delivery of the calves until after April 2, 1984.61 Subsequently,
Napoleon commenced an action in conversion against Pius,
Clemens, the Bank, and the Bank's officers. 62 The district court
entered judgment implementing the jury's findings of facts for
Napoleon on its conversion claim against Pius, awarded Napoleon
$257,000, and granted partial attorney's fees to Clemens.
63
54. Id.
55. Id. at 764-65.
56. 406 N.W.2d 346 (N.D. 1987).
57. Napoleon Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Rohrich, 406 N.W.2d 346, 348 (N.D. 1987).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Bank maintained a security interest in Pius' cattle. Id.
61. Id. Between November 25, 1983, and April 2, 1984, Pius commingled the calves with other
cattle on his farm. Id. In addition, Pius purchased approximately 626 head of cattle and sold
approximately 212 head of cattle. Id.
62. Id. at 348-49. Napoleon also alleged: (1) breach of contract by Pius and by Clemens as Pius'
partner; (2) fraud by Pius and the Bank; (3) breach of good faith or fraud by the Bank and the Bank's
officers; (4) breach of an oral contract of which Napoleon was a third-party beneficiary; (5) violation
of section 41-30-50 of the North Dakota Century Code by Pius; (6) claim to property and proceeds of
Pius; and (7) an implied trust arising out of fraud or mistake involving Pius and the Bank. Id. at 349.
63. Id. at 350.
218 [VOL. 64:211
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Napoleon and the Bank appealed from the trial court's orders.
64
The primary issues on appeal were: (1) whether the supplemental
instruction submitted by the trial court correctly stated the law of
conversion; 61 (2) whether the trial court erred in awarding partial
attorney's fees to Clemens; 66 and (3) whether the trial court erred
in denying the Bank's motion for attorney' s fees. 67
On appeal, the supreme court initially rejected Napoleon's
contention that the trial court committed error in its supplemental
instruction. 6 The court reasoned that although Napoleon had
established a "special property and an insurable interest" in the
calves on November 23, 1983, upon which to _predicate a claim of
conversion agai," "t Pius, Napoleon had failed to sufficiently identify
the calves on or after April 2, 1984, to prove conversion by the
Bank. 69 Consequently, the supreme court held that it was a
question of fact for the jury to resolve whether the calves discovered
on April 2, 1984, were the same or part of the same calves sold to
Napoleon and, accordingly, concluded that the trial court's
instruction correctly stated the law of conversion. 70
Next, the court considered whether the trial court erred in
awarding partial attorney's fees to Clemens. 71 The supreme court
64. Id. Napoleon appealed the trial court's order denying Napoleon's motions to amend for a
new trial, and the awarding of partial attorney's fees to Clemens. Id. The Bank is cross-appealing the
trial court's order denying the Bank's motion for attorney's fees and expenses. Id.
65. Id. at 351. The supplemental instruction in contention provided:
The only calves that could have been converted would be the ones Pius allegedly
contracted to sell to Napoleon Livestock under the November 23, 1983 agreement.
Calves bought by Pius or added to his herd after that date could not be converted
as Napoleon Livestock would have no right to possession of these after-acquired calves
since they would not have been included in the 700 to which the alleged contract
referred.
Id. at 349.
66. Id. at 351.
67. Id. Other issues on appeal were: (1) whether a typographical mistake in the jury's special
verdict form caused sufficient jury confusion so as to warrant a new trial; and (2) whether Napoleon's
claim of constructive trust was incidental so as to deny Napoleon's motion to amend its complaint.
Id. However, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Napoleon's motions. Id. at 355-57.
68. Id. at 351. Napoleon asserted that once the jury determined that the calves were identified
and that the Bank had waived its security interest, any subsequent commingling or replacing of the
calves was no defense to its right to recover the fair and reasonable market value of the converted
calves from Clemens and the Bank. Id.
69. Id. at 351-52. The court noted that when a plaintiff's animals are commingled with other
animals of like breed, the plaintiff must identify the animals with reasonable certainty at the time of
the alleged conversion. Id. at 352 (quoting Burgess v. Small, 151 Me. 271, -. , 117 A.2d 344, 345
(1955)).
70. Id. at 355.
71. Id. at 357. Napoleon claimed that Clemens and his son, Pius, were partners and therefore
asserted that Clemens also converted the calves. Id. at 359-60. Moreover, Napoleon asserted that
Clemens oppressively interfered by guaranteeing Pius' debt to the Bank and therefore, that
Napoleon was entitled to punitive damages. Id. at 358-59. The district court determined that
Napoleon's claims for relief against Clemens for partnership liability and punitive damages were
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noted that a court may use its discretion in awarding attorney's fees
for frivolous claims.12 Moreover, the court stated that although
most frivolous claims are terminated by summary disposition,
denial to grant summary judgment alone does not preclude an
award of attorney's fees against a party pursuing pointless claims
when subsequent proceedings have made it clear that the claims
were frivolous.7 3 The court then determined that Napoleon had no
basis in law or fact to establish that it relied on an ostensible
partnership between Pius and Clemens or that it was entitled to
punitive damages.74 Therefore, since Napoleon had no basis for
either contention, the court concluded that Napoleon's claims were
frivolous and, thus, upheld the award of attorney's fees to
Clemens. 15
Finally, the supreme court considered whether the trial court
erred in denying the Bank's motion for attorney's fees. 7 6 The Bank
asserted a right to attorney's fees under rule 11 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure,77 and under sections 28-26-01(2) and 28-
26-31 of the North Dakota Century Code.78 The supreme court
noted that rule 11 sanctions were not intended to apply to a
particular argument or ground for relief in a nonfrivolous motion. 19
Rather, the court recognized that rule 11 "permits the imposition
of sanctions only when the 'pleading, motion, or other paper' itself
is frivolous .... ",0 Because Napoleon's complaint was not frivolous,
the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Bank's motion under rule 11 or under
section 28-26-01(2).81
frivolous and, accordingly, that Clemens was entitled to partial attorney's fees. Id. at 350; see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-26-01(2) (Supp. 1987) (providing for the award of attorney's fees upon a finding
that a claim for relief is frivolous).
72. 406 N.W.2d at 357; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-26-01(2) (Supp. 1987)(providing for the
award of attorney's fees upon a finding that a claim for relief is frivolous).
73. 406 N.W.2d at 358 (citing Schwarzer, J., Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 198(1985)).
74. Id. at 359, 361.
75. Id. at 361.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 11 (courts can impose reasonable attorney's fees for violation of rule
11 requirement that pleadings that are signed by attorneys must not be frivolous).
78. 406 N.W.2d at 361; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-26-01(2) (Supp. 1987) (providing for the
award of attorney's fees upon a finding that a claim for relief is frivolous); N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-26-
31 (Supp. 1987) (directing a court to award the payment of all expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to the party having to respond to "[a]llegations and denials in any pleadings in court,
made without reasonable cause and not in good faith, and found to be untrue...."). The Bank
contended that it was entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in the defense of Napoleon's claims
against the Bank and the Bank's officers for bad faith, fraud, and punitive damages. 406 NW.2d at
361.
79. Id. at 363 (citing Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th
Cir. 1986)).





Furthermore, the court noted that section 28-26-31 authorizes
a court to award attorney's fees to a party having to respond to
accusations and repudiations contained in any pleading made
without reasonable cause, not in good faith, and determined to be
false.8 2 The court then decided that Napoleon was appropriately
protecting a legitimate interest in the calves, and that a conversion
action by the Bank was a viable claim in light of the fact that the
-Bank had received the entire purchase price of the cattle sold to
Napoleon.83 Therefore, since Napoleon's claims were not wholly
unreasonable, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in
denying the Bank's motion for attorney's fees under section 28-26-
31 .84
BANKS AND BANKING
Federal Land Bank v. Overboe
In Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 8 5 the Federal Land Bank (FLB)
appealed from a district court judgment which denied foreclosure of
its mortgage on the farmland of David and Debora Overboe (the
Overboes) and which ordered that the principal and interest of the
underlying loan be reamortized over the longest period allowed
under FLB regulations. 86 In December 1979, the Overboes
executed a mortgage to the FLB.8 7 After delinquently paying their
third annual payment, the Overboes requested that their payment
date be changed fromJuly 1 to December 31 to better coincide with
their cash flow. 88 An officer of the FLB, Roger Duransky, informed
the Overboes that in order for their payment date to be changed,
the loan would have to be reamortized and that based on the
Overboes' financial statement, income, and expense information,
the FLB would be unable to reamortize the loan. 89 Thereafter, the
Overboes again met with Duransky and provided the FLB with
their own income and expense statements for the past three years,
along with income projections for the upcoming crop year. 90
82. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-26-31 (Supp. 1987).
83. Id. at 363-64. The court also stated that if Napoleon's allegations were untrue,
unreasonable, or made in bad faith, the Bank should have moved early in the proceedings and been
successful in having them dismissed. Id. at 364.
84. Id.
85. 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987).
86. Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 446 (N.D. 1987).
87. Id.
88. Id. The Overboes made their first mortgage payment, but the July 1, 1981, payment was
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However, the FLB again denied the Overboes' request for
reamortization and brought a foreclosure action several months
later. 91
At the trial, the Overboes asserted that the foreclosure action
should be dismissed because the FLB failed to follow both its own
collection policies and the congressional mandates of the Farm
Credit Act of 1971.92 The trial court determined that the policies of
the FLB mandated a thorough evaluation of the Overboes'
situation and that the FLB had failed to follow its own procedures
and guidelines. 93  Accordingly, the trial court ordered that
foreclosure be denied and that the loan be reamortized. 94 The FLB
appealed, asserting that a failure to comply with policies,
regulations, and procedures promulgated under the Farm Credit
Act of 1971 was not a valid defense to a foreclosure action. 95
In its analysis the supreme court noted that although a private
cause of action for an injunction or for damages does not exist
under the Farm Credit Act and its regulations, several courts have
recognized that such regulations may nevertheless afford an
equitable defense to a foreclosure. 96 The court took special note of a
body of case law that acknowledged a similar equitable defense
under the National Housing Act.97 Conceding that the National
Housing Act and the Farm Credit Act had similar goals in regard
to the propriety of administrative forbearance, the court concluded
that the FLB's failure to comply with the administrative for-
bearance regulations and policies gave rise to an equitable defense
to a foreclosure action under state law. 98 Within its holding,
the court issued an important caveat stating that the adoption of the
forbearance defense did not give the court the power to substitute
its judgment for that of the FLB's loan officers. 99 Thus, the court
91. Id.
92. Id.; see Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. S 2001-2276 (1982 & 1986 Supp.).
93. Id. at 446-47.
94. Id. at 447.
95. Id. For the full text of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2276 (1982 &
Supp. 1986).
96. 404 N.W.2d at 448; see, e.g., Bowling v. Block, 785 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1986) (no
implied private right of action exists under Farm Credit Act), cert. denied sub nor., Bower v. Lyng,
107 S. Ct. 112 (1986).
97. 404 N.W.2d at 448-49; see, e.g., Cross v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 359 So.2d 464, 465
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (mortgage foreclosures are equitable actions, therefore, equitable defenses
apply); see National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §S 1701-1750 (1980 & Supp. 1987); Brown v. Lynn,
392 F. Supp. 559, 562-63 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (courts should exercise equity powers by refusing to grant
foreclosures where there has been flagrant disregard of foreclosure proceedings); Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. Moore, 609 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (N.D. Il. 1985) (failure of a lender to follow
HUD regulations governing mortgage servicing constitutes a valid defense to deny lender relief in a
foreclosure action).
98. 404 N.W.2d at 449.
99. Id. at 449-50.
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clarified its holding by stating that a trial court cannot overturn an
FLB officer's determination of lack of borrower qualification for
forbearance relief unless the borrower can prove that the bank
abused its discretion by acting in an arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable or unconscionable manner. 00  Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed as modified. 1 01
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Wallwork Lease & Rental Co. v. Schermerhorn
In Wallwork Lease & Rental Co. v. Schermerhorn, 102 the
Schermerhorns appealed from a judgment holding them liable to
Wallwork Lease and Rental Company (Wallwork) for the balance
of a lease on grain-drying equipment. 103 The trial court claimed
personal jurisdiction over the Schermerhorns after the
Schermerhorns agreed with Wallwork to an indefinite extension of
time for pleadings. 104 The primary issue on appeal was whether, by
reason of engaging in settlement negotiations for a period of time
and by agreeing to an extension of time for pleading, the trial court
obtained personal jurisdiction over the Schermerhorns. 
105
The supreme court stated that a court in North Dakota may
obtain personal jurisdiction over any person by the voluntary
general appearance of that person in the action. 106 The court stated
that the issue was whether the Schermerhorns "recognized the case
as in court" and generally appeared when their counsel engaged in
settlement negotiations. 0 7 Relying on views expressed in other
100. Id. at 450.
101. Id. at 452.
102. 398 N.W.2d 127 (N.D. 1986).
103. Wallwork Lease & Rental Co. v. Schermerhorn, 398 N.W.2d 127, 128 (N.D. 1986). The
Schermerhorns, Minnesota residents, were engaged in farming and leased grain-drying equipment
from Wallwork. Id. They made the first annual payment but failed to make any further payments.
Id. After Wallwork commenced this action, it moved for a default judgment, but was denied. Id. The
trial court also denied the Schermerhorns' motion for dismissal based upon lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id.
104. See id. The case was subsequentLy tried to the court and judgment was entered in favor of
Wallwork for $34,121.70. Id.
105. Id. The other issue on appeal was whether, if the Wallwork lease was a security agreement,
Wallwork disposed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Id. at 128-29. The
supreme court held that the trial court's finding of a commercially reasonable sale was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 131.
106. Id. at 129. Rule 4(b)(4) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a North
Dakota court may obtain personal jurisdiction over any person through proper service of process, or
by general voluntary appearance in an action. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b)(4).
107. 398 N.W.2d at 129. The court noted a prior case in which the supreme court held that any
action by the defendant, except to object to the jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in court,
will amount to a general appearance. Id.; see In re McIntyre's Estate, 78 N.D. 10, 26, 47 N.W.2d
527, 584 (1951). The court also noted that "appearance" is given a broad interpretation in the
context of Rule 55 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that notice be given
before a default judgment may be entered against a party who has appeared in the action. 398
N.W.2d at 130; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 55.
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jurisdictions, the court determined that the commencement of
settlement negotiations or the securing of an agreement to extend
the time to plead may constitute a general appearance.108 Because
the Schermerhorns engaged in settlement negotiations and agreed
to an extension of time for pleadings, the court concluded that they
made a general appearance waiving any jurisdictional defects. 10 9
Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the Schermerhorns. 
1 10
CIVIL RIGHTS
Linderkamp v. Bismarck School District No. 1
In Linderkamp v. Bismarck School District No. 1,111 Louis
Linderkamp, Sharon Linderkamp and Christ Walker (the
Linderkamps) appealed from that portion of the district court's
judgment which denied their request for attorney's fees pursuant to
title 42, section 1988 of the United States Code. 112 At the trial court
level, the Linderkamps challenged the Bismarck School District's
(District) practice of transferring monies from the district's general
fund to a building fund and its use of "judgment funding" to levy
additional taxes to be used to pay judgments in condemnation
actions initiated by the District.113 The Linderkamps sought
declaratory relief under North Dakota law1 14 and asserted a claim
pursuant to title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code alleging
that the District had violated their substantive due process rights
through unlawful and excessive taxation. 1 5 The trial court granted
the Linderkamps injunctive relief but denied their request for
attorney's fees. 11
6
108. 398 N.W.2d at 129. This issue was one of first impression for the North Dakota Supreme
Court, and as such the court looked to other jurisdiction's views of what actions may constitute a
general appearance. Id.; see, e.g., Security Management, Inc. v. Schoolfield Furniture Indus., Inc.,
275 S.C. 466, -, 272 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1980) (agreement or stipulation extending time to plead
constituted a general appearance); Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 272 S.C. 282, -, 251 S.E.2d 735,
737-38 (1979) (defendant's letter to plaintiff regarding settlement possibilities constituted a general
appearance).
109. 398 N.W.2d at 130. The court concluded that where a party through an attorney has
secured an indefinite extension of time to answer and then engages in settlement negotiations spread
over a period of nine months, the party has clearly "recognized the case as in court," and thus has
made a general appearance. Id.
110. Id.
111. 397 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1986).
112. Linderkamp v. Bismarck School Dist. No. 1, 397 N.W.2d 76, 77 (N.D. 1986); see-42
U.S.C. S 1988 (1982)(allowing the award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties, other than the
United States, that have brought proceedings for the vindication of civil rights.).
113. 397 N.W.2d at 77.
114. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-33 (1976 & Supp. 1987) (Declaratory Judgments Act).
115. 397 N.W.2d at 77; see 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1982) (a civil action exists if a person is deprived
of his or her rights).
116. 397 N.W.2d at 78.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that to receive an
award of attorney's fees, the Linderkamps had to have a section
1983 action which was cognizable in state court.II7 The dispositive
issue on appeal accordingly became whether a section 1983 claim
which challenged the assessment or levy of taxes under state law
could be brought in state court. 118 The supreme court noted that
federal district courts are prohibited by the Tax Injunction Act
from entertaining actions which would enjoin the assessment of
taxes imposed by state law. 119 The court recognized that many state
courts have adopted the view that although the Tax Injunction Act
applies only to federal district courts, state court jurisdiction should
also be limited on the grounds that a section 1983 challenge that
cannot be brought in federal district court should not be
entertained in state court. 120 The court, however, declined to adopt
that view and chose instead to follow the approach taken by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut.121 That approach declares that the
Tax Injunction Act does not deprive state courts of all jurisdiction
to hear section 1983 challenges to state taxes, but nevertheless
provides a guide to development of state law limitations to state
court jurisdiction of section 1983 actions. 122 Accordingly, the court
looked to the policy underpinnings of the Tax Injunction Act and
held that a section 1983 action challenging the levy of state taxes
could not be brought in state court where there is already an
adequate remedy under state law. 23  Therefore, since the
Linderkamps had already received expeditious and adequate relief
under state law, the court held that the Linderkamps did not have a
section 1983 claim which was cognizable in state court and, accord-
ingly, denied the Linderkamps' request for attorney's fees. 124
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 1341 (1982) (prohibiting federal district courts from enjoining,
suspending or restraining the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where an
adequate remedy is available in the courts of such state).
120. 397 N.W.2d at 78-79; see, e.g., Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, - , 224 S.E.2d 370, 374-
75 (1976) (the overriding interests of the state in an efficient, expeditious, and nondisruptive
resolution of ad valorum tax suits, would be seriously impaired by the allowance of section 1983
suits).
121. 397 N.W.2d at 79. The Supreme Court of Connecticut established its view on section 1983
challenges to state taxation in Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682, __, 490
A.2d 509, 513-14 (1985) (the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive state courts of all jurisdiction to
hear section 1983 challenges to state taxes but acts as guide to the development of state jurisdictional
limitations).
122. 397 N.W.2d at 79.
123. Id. at 80.
124. Id. Thd court also rejected the District's contention that the Linderkamps' appeal was
frivolous. Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 125 the plaintiffs
appealed from a district court decision dismissing their action in
which they sought to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools from
collecting fees for providing bus service to students. 126 The
plaintiffs contended that section 15-34.2-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code unconstitutionally authorized fee charges for
schoolbus services in violation of article VIII, section 2 of the North
Dakota Constitution, which provides for a system of free public
schools. 27 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended that the schoolbus
charges authorized by section 15-34.2-06.1 violated their right to
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the North Dakota
Constitution.1
28
The supreme court held that article VIII, section 2 of the
North Dakota Constitution does not require the state or the school
districts to provide free transportation for students to and from
school. 29 The court reasoned that the long-standing legislative
practice of making transportation a shared responsibility between
parents and school districts provided an indication that the
requirement of free public schools did not mandate free student
transportation. 30 Therefore, the court held that section 15-34.2-
125. 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1987).
126. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. 1987). The school
district offers bus transportation to and from school for elementary students residing more than three
miles from school and for high school students residing more than four miles from school. Id. The
plaintiffs resided approximately sixteen miles from school. Id. The fee covered approximately eleven
percent of the school district's cost for providing the bus service. Id. Eighty-nine percent of the cost
was provided by state and local tax revenues. Id.
127. Id. at 899; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 15-34.2-06.1 (Supp. 1987) (unreorganized school
districts may charge a fee for school bus service provided by the school district); N.D. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2 (legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system of free public schools). The
plaintiffs contended that free bus transportation to and from school was part of a "free" public
school system. 402 N.W.2d at 899.
128. 402 N.W.2d at 902; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 (equal protection clause); N.D.
CONST. art. 1, 5 22 (equal protection clause). The plaintiffs based their equal protection claim on two
separate allegedly discriminatory classifications. 402 N.W.2d at 902. First, they contended that the
schoolbus service charges created a wealth classification which discriminated against poor or indigent
persons. Id. Second, they asserted that the statute created a classification between reorganized and
nonreorganized districts which discriminated against persons residing in the nonreorganized
districts. Id.
129. 402 N.W.2d at 902; see N.D. CONST. art. VIII, S 2 (uniform system of free public schools).
130. 402 N.W.2d at 900. The court also looked to a Michigan Court of Appeals case which
construed a constitutional provision similar to article VIII, section 2 of the North Dakota
Constitution. Id. at 903; see Sutton v. Cadillac Area Pub. Schools, 117 Mich. App. 38, -, 323
N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (1982) (concluding that transportation to and from school is not an essential
part of free public education and failure to provide free transportation did not violate the Michigan
Constitution).
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06.1 does not violate the North Dakota Constitution. 131
Furthermore, the supreme court concluded that section 15-
34.2-06.1 does not violate the federal or state equal protection of
the poor or persons residing in nonreorganized districts. 132 The
court determined that the appropriate standard of review for the
plaintiffs' equal protection claims was the rational basis test. 33
Because the statute was rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objectives of allocating limited resources and of
encouraging school district reorganization, the supreme court held
that the statute did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection
rights. 134 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision
to dismiss the plaintiffs' action. 13
5
Trinity Medical Center v. North Dakota Board of Nursing
In Trinity Medical Center v. North Dakota Board of Nursing, 136 the
plaintiffs, nursing school operators, brought an action against the
North Dakota Board of Nursing (Board) and its individual
members. 137 The plaintiffs asserted that the authority given by the
legislature to the Board constituted a standardless delegation of
legislative authority in violation of article III, section 1 of the North
Dakota Constitution. 138 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Board had usurped purely legislative powers in promulgating
accreditation standards for nursing education programs and in
establishing educational prerequisites for license examination. 13 9
131. 402 N.W.2d at 902.
132. Id. at 903.
133. Id. at 902. The court reasoned that the challenged statute was purely economic legislation
which involved neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental or important substantive right. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that in similar equal protection challenges to legislation involving
student transportation, the traditional rational basis standard of review had been employed. Id.; see,
e.g., Shaffer v. Board of School Directors, 687 F.2d 718, 721 (3rd Cir. 1982) (employing the rational
basis standard). The court concluded that under the rational basis test, the statute must be upheld
unless it was patently arbitrary and failed to bear a rational relationship to any legitimate
government purpose. 402 N.W.2d at 902.
134. 402 N.W.2d at 903. The court concluded that since the statute was rationally related to the
government objective of allocating limited resources, the statute did not discriminate on the basis of
wealth. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that since the legislation served the legitimate
government objective of encouraging school district reorganization with a concomitant tax base
expansion, the statutory scheme was rationally related to accomplishing that objective. Id.
Accordingly, the court held that the statute did not violate the federal equal protection rights of
persons residing in nonreorganized districts. Id.
135. Id. at 904. Justice Levine dissented from the majority's equal protection analysis. Id.
(Levine, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Levine stated that since education is a fundamental
right in North Dakota, an intermediate standard of review is appropriate. Id. at 904-05. Under this
standard of review, Justice Levine concluded that the statute violated article I, section 22 of the
North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 905.
136. 399 N.W.2d 835 (N.D. 1987).
137. Trinity Medical Center v. North Dakota Bd. of Nursing, 399 N.W.2d 835, 836 (N.D.
1987).
138. Id.; see N.D. CONST. art. Ill, 1 (legislative power vested in a legislative assembly).
139. 399 N.W.2d at 836.
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The district court temporarily restrained enforcement of the
challenged Board rules and certified questions concerning the
Board's authority to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 140
The supreme court initially considered whether the certified
questions were properly before the court.1 41 The court noted that
pursuant to section 32-24-02 of the North Dakota Century Code,
the decision to submit certified questions is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. 14 2 However, the supreme court stated
that before a certified question will be analyzed, it must be shown
that the answers to the certified questions will principally resolve
the remaining issues of the case. 143 Because the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in certifying the questions, and since the
answers to the questions would principally resolve the remaining
issues in the case, the supreme court proceeded to adjudicate the
certified questions. 144
The court then considered whether the authority given by the
legislature to the Board of Nursing was a standardless delegation of
legislative authority. 145 Finding its rationale in Ralston Purina Co. v.
Hagemeister146 persuasive, the court emphasized that "[w]hile purely
legislative powers cannot be delegated, the Legislature may
authorize others...to exercise certain powers.. .which the
Legislature itself might do but cannot because of the detailed
nature of the things to be done.' 1 47 Furthermore, the court noted
that a power delegated is not legislative if the law provides
reasonably unequivocal guidelines which aid the administrative
body in ascertaining facts upon which it can act under the law's
provision rather than according to its own discretion. 148 Finally, the
court recognized that under the modern approach to the
nondelegation doctrine, both standards and safeguards are
140. Id. at 836-37.
141. Id. at 837.
142. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-24-02 (1976) (certifying a question is in the sound discretion of
the trial judge). The court also noted that the supreme court may decline to consider certified
questions that are frivolous, merely interlocatory, or of nominal importance to settle the issues in the
case. 399 N.W.2d at 837 (citing City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks County, 139 N.W.2d 242, 248
(N.D. 1965)).
143. 399 N.W.2d at 838. In addition, the court stated that the plaintiff must have standing to
sue. Id. The court noted that the two-fold test of standing provides that the plaintiff must have
suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the alleged unlawful conduct, and the
asserted harm must not be a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. Id. The
court then held that the plaintiffs had sufficient standing to sue. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 188 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971).
147. 399 N.W.2d at 843 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405, 407
(N.D. 1971)).
148. Id. (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Hagemeister, 188 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 1971)).
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essential to assure that administrative agencies are not given
unbridled discretion.14 9 With the preceding principles in mind, the
court determined that the standards set for the Board, while broad,
were sufficient to uphold the statute's constitutionality. 
5 0
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the Board had
usurped legislative power in enacting administrative rules pursuant
to section 43-12.1-08(6). 151 The court noted that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the legislature to develop timely
definitive standards given the ever-changing status of modern
medical technology. 152 Moreover, the court stated that the
legislature's power to retract the Board's authority to set standards
was a safeguarding influence on the Board to promulgate
regulations only within the statutory guidelines and to exercise
reasonable reticence. 153 Finally, the court noted that the approval
of the Board's standard-setting authority was consistent with the
modern application of the nondelegation doctrine. 154 Accordingly,
the supreme court determined that the Board did not usurp purely
legislative powers in enacting accreditation standards for nursing




State v. J. P. Lamb Land Co.
In State v. J.P. Lamb Land Co., 156 the State of North Dakota
appealed from a summary judgment dismissing its complaint
against the J.P. Lamb Land Company (Lamb). 157 Since 1904,
Lamb has existed as a North Dakota corporation with a principal
purpose of leasing more than 5000 acres of farmland it owns in
Nelson and Walsh counties. 158 In 1932, North Dakota voters
approved the Corporate Farming Law which prohibited
corporations from engaging in farming and required that all
149. Id. at 844; see K. DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE SS 3:14,3:15 (2d ed. 1978 &
Supp. 1982) (modern trend of state nondelegation doctrine is to consider safeguards along with or
instead of standards).
150. 399 N.W.2d at 847.
151. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 43-12.1-08(b) (1978) (powers and duties of the North Dakota
board of nursing).
152. Id. at 848.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 327 (N.D.
1985)).
155. Id.
156. 401 N.W.2d 713 (N.D. 1987).
157. State v.J.P. Lamb Land Co., 401 N.W.2d 713, 715 (N.D. 1987).
158. Id. Lamb acquired ownership of all the farmland relevant to this dispute prior to the
enactment of the North Dakota Corporate Farming Law. Id.
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corporations then owning or thereafter acquiring real estate,
''except such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of their
business" to dispose of the real estate within ten years.
159
Consequently, in 1965, the State brought an action against Lamb
alleging that it was in violation of the Corporate Farming Law. 160
However, the district court held that the exception embodied in the
statute applied and dismissed the State's complaint. 161
Subsequently, in 1981, the legislature amended the Corporate
Farming Law by repealing the exception relied upon by the district
court and essentially permitted only closely held family farm
corporations to own or lease land used for farming or ranching.162
Thereafter, the State commenced this action in Nelson County,
and Lamb moved to dismiss, asserting that: (1) the 1981 amend-
ments were not applicable to Lamb; 163 (2) the doctrine of res
judicata barred the State's action;164 and (3) the application of those
amendments did not provide a reasonable period of time for
divestment in violation of the due process clauses of the United
States and North Dakota Constitutions. 165 The district court
decided in favor of Lamb and the State appealed. 166
The supreme court held that Lamb's ownership of farmland
was subject to the 1981 amendments. 167 The court reasoned that
although Lamb may not have been in violation of the law when it
acquired its land before the 1981 amendments, the legislature
had the authority to repeal or alter that law by virtue of article XII,
section 2 of the North Dakota Constitution and by section 10-23-17
159. Id.; see Act approved June 29, 1932, ch. 89, 1933 N.D. Laws 494 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 10-06 (1975 & Supp. 1987)).
160. 401 N.W.2d at 715.
161. 401 N.W.2d at 715. The trial court concluded that the "except such as is reasonably
necessary in the conduct of its business" exception applied to Lamb and, therefore, dismissed the
state's complaint. Id.
162. Id.; see Act approved Mar. 30, 1981, ch. 134, 1981 N.D. Laws 310-11 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 10-06- 07 (1975)).
163. 401 N.W.2d at 716. Lamb contended that the legislature did not intend retroactive
application of the 1981 amendments to its ownership of farmland. Id. Rather, Lamb asserted that the
legislature's silence on the application of the 1981 amendments to corporations complying with the
Corporate Farming Law before 1981.compelled the conclusion that the amendments were not to be
applied retroactively under section 1-02-10 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 1-02-10 (1987) (providing that no provisions of the code are retroactive unless so declared).
164. 401 N.W.2d at 716. Lamb contended that the underlying facts of the 1965 action (i.e.
ownership of farmland) were identical to the underlying facts of this action and, thus, the 1965
decision was resjudicata as to the present action. Id. at 718.
165. Id. at 716. Lamb contended that the 1981 amendments deprived it of property without due
process of law under the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. Id. at 718; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, (guaranteeing due process of law); N.D. CONST. art. I, S 9 (same).
166. 401 N.W.2d at 716. The district court held that the 1965 court decision was resjudicata as
to this action and that the 1981 amendments were inapplicable to Lamb because the legislature had
not expressly declared that they applied retroactively to corporations owning farmland before 1981.
Id.
167. Id. at 717-18.
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of the North Dakota Century Code. 168 Furthermore, the supreme
court concluded that the intervening statutory amendments to the
Corporate Farming Law precluded Lamb from successfully
asserting the res judicata defense. 169 The court reasoned that res
judicata is not a defense if, between the first judgment and the
second action, there has been an intervening change in the law or
modification of significant facts creating new legal conditions. 170
The court noted that although the factual situation may not have
changed since the 1965 court decision, the 1981 amendments
constituted an intervening statutory change and, thus, the issues in
this case were different from those litigated in the 1965 action. 1
71
The supreme court, however, concurred with Lamb's
contention that the 1981 amendments did not provide a reasonable
period of time for Lamb to divest itself of the land. 172 The court
noted that before 1981, the period of divestment which the United
States Supreme Court had determined provided a corporation
with a fair opportunity to realize the value of its land was ten
years. 71 Consequently, because of the unique circumstances in the
case and in view of the United States Supreme Court's approval of
the ten-year divestment period, the court determined that a more
appropriate period of divestment for Lamb was ten years from the
effective date of the 1981 amendments. 174 Accordingly, the North
Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to enter
an order requiring Lamb to either comply with the Corporate
Farming Law or divest itself of its farmland by July 1, 1991.175
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Micko
In State v. Micko, 176 Micko appealed from a conviction of theft
168. Id. at 717; see N.D. CONST. art. XII, S 2 (legislative assembly shall provide general laws for
the organization of all corporations, and any such law is subject to future repeal or alteration); N.D.
CENT. CODE S 10-23-17 (1985) (legislature may amend or repeal any statute relating to corporations).
The supreme court rejected Lamb's contention that the State was seeking to retroactively apply the
1981 amendments. 401 N.W.2d at 717. The court reasoned that the unambiguous language of the
1981 amendments could only be construed to mean that the legislature intended that a corporation's
continuing ownership of farmland was subject to those amendments. Id. Therefore, since Lamb
continued to own farmland after 1981, its ownership was subject to those amendments. Id.
169. 401 N.W.2d at 718.
170. Id.; see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. .v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945) (res
judicata is no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been an
intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation).
171. 401 N.W.2d at 718.
172. Id. at 720.
173. Id. at 719; see Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1945) (ten years is a
sufficient amount of time for a corporation to realize the value of its property).
174. 401 N.W.2d at 720.
175. Id.
176. 393 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1986).
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of property.' 77 Micko contended that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by admitting into evidence a statement that he
made concerning his past shoplifting activities.7 8 The State,
however, asserted that Micko's statement that he was a hard-
working professional shoplifter was admissible as evidence of his
intent to shoplift. 7 9 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed Micko's conviction. 8 0
The supreme court noted that evidence of prior acts is
generally not admissible unless to prove something other than
conformity with past behavior.'8 ' The court recognized a three-step
approach for determining the relevance of evidence proffered under
rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, but noted that
even if these requirements are met, the evidence must still have
greater probative value than prejudicial consequences.18 2 The court
determined that the trial court had erred in admitting Micko's
statement into evidence because the trial judge had failed to make
the essential balancing test between probative value and prejudice
caused by the admission. 83 However, because of the overwhelming
evidence of Micko's guilt presented to the jury, the court
determined that the trial court's error was harmless and, therefore,
affirmed Micko's conviction.1
8 4
The supreme court also rejected Micko's contention that he
was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.8 5
The court noted that in determining whether counsel is ineffective,
177. State v. Micko, 393 N.W.2d 741, 742 (N.D. 1986). Micko was found guilty of two counts
of theft of property in excess of $500 in relation to a shoplifting spree in which he stole over $2500 of
merchandise from four department stores. Id. at 742-43.
178. Id. at 743. Micko allegedly made several statements concerning his past shoplifting
activities to an agent of the Minnesota Bureau of Crime Apprehension. Id. The trial court admitted
into evidence Micko's statement that he had been a professional shoplifter for over 25 years and that
it had been hard work. Id.
179. Id. The state argued that Micko's statement was admissible under the other purposes
exception to rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. Id.; see N.D.R. EVID. 404(b)
(evidence of crimes is admissible to prove intent).
180. 393 N.W.2d at 748.
181. Id. at 743-44; see N.D. R. EvID. 404(b) (evidence of prior acts not admissible to prove
character or to show conformity therewith).
182. 393 N.W.2d at 744; see N.D. R. EvID. 404(b); N.D. R. EvID. 403 (relevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice). The court noted
that under the three-step approach, the court must determine the purpose for which the evidence is
offered, the evidence offered must be clear and convincing, and there must be proof of the crime
charged. 393 N.W.2d at 744. See generally State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251, 257-59 (N.D. 1975)
(quoting McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, S 190 (2d ed. 1972)).
183. 393 N.W.2d at 745. The court based its decision on the following: (1) The failure of the
trial court to utilize the proper analysis when considering the admissibility of the evidence; (2)
Micko's statement was prejudicial and in violation of the purposes behind rules 403 and 404(b); (3)
the evidence was unnecessary in light of other evidence; and (4) the purpose of admitting Micko's
statement was not to reveal his intent but to characterize Micko as a professional shoplifter who acted
in conformity therewith. Id. at 745-46.
184. Id. at 746.
185. Id. at 747-48.
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the ultimate focus of judicial inquiry must be on the fundamental
fairness of the proceeding by considering the totality of the evidence
presented to the jury.1 86 Moreover, the court recognized that!
pursuant to the United Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, 187 the defendant must affirmatively present proof of
actual prejudice to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance. 18 8 Since
Micko had failed to offer proof establishing a reasonable probability
that the outcome of his trial would have been different and, thus,
did not establish sufficient prejudice to render his trial
fundamentally unfair, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction. 1 89
City of Mandan v. Mertz
In City of Mandan v. Mertz,1 90  the city of Mandan
appealed from an order of the Morton County Court dismissing
charges brought against Mertz.1 91 In the Mandan Municipal
Court, Mertz was convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol and of driving under suspension. 192 However, on appeal,
the Morton County Court dismissed the action reasoning that the
city of Mandan had failed to introduce into evidence copies of the
underlying ordinances.193 The primary issue on appeal was
whether the county court erred in failing to judicially notice the
municipal ordinances. 194
Initially, the supreme court stated that the county court's
determination that it could not take judicial notice of city
ordinances was not a determination of a factual element of either
offense and, thus, neither appeal nor retrial of the defendant would
violate the double jeopardy clause.195 The court then noted that
section 40-18-19 of the North Dakota Century Code requires a
municipal court, upon reviewing a decision on appeal, to take
judicial notice of all city ordinances. 1 96 Consequently, the supreme
186. Id. at 747.
187. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
188. 393 N.W.2d at 747; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (defendant
must show that attorney's deficient performance prejudiced his or her defense). The court noted that
the standard utilized in this determination is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. 393 N.W.2d at 747 (citing State
v. Thompson, 359 N.W.2d 374, 377 (N.D. 1985)).
189. 393 N.W.2d at 747-48.
190. 399 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1987).
191. City ofMandan v. Mertz, 399 N.W.2d 298, 299 (N.D. 1987).
192. Id.
193. Id. The Morton County Court reasoned that it could not judicially notice the underlying
ordinances since they were not entered into evidence. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see N.D. CONST. art. I, S 12 (1981) ("[nmo person shall be twice put injeopardy for the
same offense. ")
196. Id.; see N.D. CENT. Coo S 40-18-19 (Supp. 1987) ("[o]n all appeals from a determination
in a municipal court, the appellate court shall take judicial notice of all of the ordinances of the
city.").
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court held that where judicial notice of a municipal ordinance is
statutorily required, there is no prerequisite that a copy of the
ordinance be placed in evidence. 197 Rather, the court stated that
where judicial notice is mandated the court need only be supplied
with the "necessary information" regarding the ordinances. 198
Since the necessary information was provided, the supreme court
held that the county court erroneously concluded that it could not
judicially notice the ordinances. 199 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the county court's order of dismissal and remanded the
case for a new trial. 20
0
State v. Reil
In State v. Reil,20' Reil appealed from a conviction of driving
under the influence of alcohol and from an order denying his
motion for a new trial. 20 2 At the trial court level, the results of
Reil's blood-alcohol test were admitted into evidence over Reil's
objection that the State had not established the chain of custody of
the blood sample, and over his contention that the State had the
burden of showing that the blood drawn from him was the same
blood examined by the State Toxicologist. 203 The primary issue on
appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting the results of
Reil's blood-alcohol test. 
204
The supreme court recognized that under North Dakota law,
the State need not prove every step in the chain of custody with an
absolute certainty as long "as the circumstances of the test provide
a reasonable assurance that the sample was withdrawn and tested in
a reliable manner.' '205 Furthermore, the court noted that the State
197. 399 N.W.2d at 299.
198. Id. at 299-300.
199. Id. at 300.
200. Id.
201. 409 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1987).
202. State v. Reil, 409 N.W.2d 99, 100 (N.D. 1987); see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01 (1987)
(providing a penalty to persons operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol).
203. 409 N.W.2d at 100-01. At the time of his arrest, Reil requested an independent blood test.
Id. at 100. The state subpoenaed the results of that blood test from the State Toxicologist's office and
at trial offered a certified copy of the results of that blood test. Id. The arresting officer, although
present when Reil's blood sample was drawn, did not testify as to the procedures used to preserve the
blood sample nor did he testify as to its handling and mailing. Id. at 101-02.
204. Id. at 101. Reil also contended that the blood-alcohol results were improperly admitted
"because the proper care, custody and control of the Standard Solution was not demonstrated." Id.
at 104. However, the supreme court held that Reil failed to offer any rebutting evidence to refute the
prima facie showing that his breath test was fair and accurate. Id.
205. Id. at 101 (quoting Sullivan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Alaska
1978)); see, e.g., State v. Hanson, 345 N.W.2d 845, 849-50 (ND. 1984) (court held that State
provided sufficient foundation to admit results of blood-alcohol test where arresting officer testified
that defendant's blood sample was withdrawn from him under clean and sterile conditions, and
described the procedures utilized in handling and mailing the blood sample to the State
Toxicologist).
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must make a "threshold showing that reasonable precautions were
taken against the risk of alteration, contamination or
adulteration." 2 0 6 The court stated that although it is not necessary
for the State to call all persons who have handled the blood sample
in order to introduce the test results, the State must show that the
sample tested is the same one originally drawn from the
defendant. 20 7 Because the State failed to prove that the blood
sample tested was the same one drawn from Reil, the supreme
court held that the trial court erred in admitting the blood-alcohol
test results as evidence and, accordingly, erred when it denied
Reil's motion for a new trial.208 Therefore, the court reversed
Reil's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
20 9
State v. Vermilya
In State v. Vermilya, 210 Vermilya appealed a district court
conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. 211 In October
1985, Vermilya was convicted in Montana on felony and
misdemeanor charges of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. 212
Vermilya's sentences on the convictions were deferred and
Vermilya was placed on probation. 213 One of the conditions of
Vermilya's probation was that he would submit to a search of his
person, vehicle or place of residence by parole or probation officers
with or without a warrant upon reasonable cause at anytime day or
night. 214 On December 17, 1985, Vermilya's residence was
searched by a North Dakota probation officer without Vermilya's
consent and without a search warrant. 215 Two rifles and one
handgun were found during the search resulting in charges against
Vermilya. 216 On appeal, Vermilya contended that the probation
206. 409 N.W.2d at 103 (quoting Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
207. Id. at 104.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 105. Justice Meschke dissented from the majority's determination that the certified
copy of the results of Reil's blood-alcohol test from the State Toxicologist's office was erroneously
admitted into evidence. Id. at 105 (Meschke, J., dissenting). Justice Meschke contended that section
39-20-07 of the North Dakota Century Coe applied, and thus, the signed statement of the nurse
who obtained the blood sample was prima facie evidence that the blood sample was properly drawn
and no further foundation was required. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-20-07 (1987) (providing that
"[a] signed statement from the nurse.. .drawing the blood sample for testing.. is prima facie evidence
that the blood sample was properly drawn and no further foundation for the admission of such
evidence may be required.").
210. 395 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1986).
211. State v. Vermilya, 395 N.W.2d 151, 151 (N.D. 1986).
212. Id.
213. Id. Since Vermilya was a North Dakota resident, he was eligible for an interstate transfer of
probation and his probation was accepted by North Dakota authorities. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 151-52. Vermilya was charged under section 62.1-02-01 of thc North Dakota
Century Code for the possession of firearms. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 62.1-02-01 (Supp. 1987)
(providing for the imposition of a penalty on any felon possessing a firearm).
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officer did not have reasonable cause and, thus, his fourth
amendment rights were violated.
217
The supreme court determined that tle probation officer had
reasonable cause to conduct the search. 218 The officer had
previously testified that he conducted the search of Vermilya's
residence to determine whether another probationer was residing
therein. 219 Since a condition of Vermilya's probation was that he
refrain from association with any person with a criminal record, the
court held that the probation officer had reasonable cause to believe
that Vermilya was violating that condition. 220 Consequently, the
supreme court held, as did the trial court, that the probation officer
had reasonable cause to conduct the search of Vermilya's
residence. 221
State v. Kesler
In State v. Kesler,222 Kesler appealed from a conviction of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 223 On
March 20, 1985, a package addressed to Kesler arrived at the Velva
Post Office.2 24 The postmaster, suspecting that the package
contained a controlled substance, contacted the police
department. 225 On March 21, 1985, a trained police dog detected
the presence of drugs in the package and the police obtained a
search warrant. 226 On the next day, Kesler picked up the package
at the post office and the police arrested him after a search of the
package revealed that it contained a controlled substance.2 27 On
appeal, Kesler contended that the detention and subsequent canine
"sniff" of his package violated the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2
28
The supreme court determined that the detention of Kesler's
package was not an unreasonable seizure under the fourth
217. 395 N.W.2d at 152. The State asserted that the probation officer did not need reasonable
cause to search Vermilya's residence and that, in any event, the officer did have reasonable cause to




221. Id. Accordingly, the order denying Vermilya's motion to suppress and the judgment of
conviction based upon Vermilya's guilty plea were affirmed by the supreme court. Id.
222. 396 N.W.2d 729 (N.D. 1986).
223. State v. Kesler, 396 N.W.2d 729, 730 (N.D. 1986).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 731.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 731-32; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing the "right of the people to be




amendment.2 29 The court recognized that in determining the
reasonableness of a seizure, the nature and quality of the police
intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests must be
balanced against the importance of the governmental interests
which are alleged to justify the intrusion.23 0 The court noted that
the delay which occurred when the police arranged for a canine
"sniff" was reasonable, 231 and that the detention of the package
was such a limited intrusion into Kesler's fourth amendment rights
that it was justified. 232 Moreover, the court stated that where
specific facts are present which warrant a reasonable belief that a
package contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the
package briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial.
233
Therefore, in view of the length of the delay, the reasons justifying
the delay, and the interests furthered by the delay, the court
concluded- that the detention of Kesler's package was not an
unreasonable seizure. 234 Furthermore, the court recognized that
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Place,235 a canine sniff does not constitute a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 23 6 Therefore, the supreme
court concluded that Kesler's fourth amendment rights were not
violated.237
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner
In Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner,238 Kuntz appealed from
a district court judgment upholding the Highway Commissioner's
decision to revoke his driver's license for refusing to take an
intoxilyzer test.2 39 Kuntz was arrested for driving while under the
influence of alcohol.240 At the station house, an officer informed
Kuntz that his refusal to take an intoxilyzer test would result in the
automatic revocation of his driver's license.24 1 Kuntz responded by
229. 396 N.W.2d at 734.
230. Id. at 732 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
231. Id. at 733. The package was delayed for 34 hours. Id.
232. Id. at 732. The supreme court reasoned that when the sender of a package delivers it to the
Postal Service, she relinquishes control over the package and thus, has no more than a minimal
interest in the package being free from delay in delivery. Id.
233. Id. at 733 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
234. Id. at 734.
235. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
236. 396 N.W.2d at 734; see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). Although Place
concerned the reasonableness of a canine "sniff" of luggage in an airport, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that the same reasoning applied to the canine "sniff' of a package mailed
through a United States Postal Service at the fourth-class rate. 396 N.W.2d at 735.
237. 396 N.W.2d at 734, 735.
238. 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987).
239. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 285 (N.D. 1987).
240. Id. at 286.
241. Id.
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requesting to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to
submit to the intoxilyzer test. 242 When the officer denied his
requst, Kuntz did not take the intoxilyzer test, and as a result, the
Commissioner revoked his driver's license for a period of two
years. 243 The issue on appeal was whether Kuntz had a statutory
right under section 29-05-20 of the North Dakota Century Code to
contact an attorney before deciding to take an intoxilyzer test.
244
The supreme court noted that under section 29-05-20, an
arrested person has a statutory right to visit with an attorney upon
request after his or her arrest. 245 Therefore, the supreme court
determined that, absent material interference with an intoxilyzer
test, an arrested person is entitled to have a reasonable opportunity
to consult with an attorney before deciding to submit to a chemical
test. 246 However, the court noted that if the person arrested is
unable to contact an attorney within a reasonable time, he or she
can be required to elect between taking the test or refusing it
without the aid of an attorney. 247 Therefore, since Kuntz was not
allowed a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney after he
requested to do so, the supreme court reversed the Commissioner's
decision to revoke his driver's license.
248
242. Id.
243. Id. at 286-87.
244. Id. at 287; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 29-05-20 (1974) (accused has right to visit with an
attorney after the arrest).
245. 405 N.W.2d 287; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 29-05-20 (1974) (accused has right to visit with an
attorney after the arrest).
246. 405 N.W.2d at 290. The court found persuasive the rationale of other jurisdictions which
had interpreted their right-to-counsel statutes as entitling a person arrested for driving under the
influence to a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding to take a chemical
test. Id. at 287; see State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978) (holding that an arrested
person is entitled to a reasonable opportunity, if requested, to speak with an attorney before being
required to decide to take a chemical test); Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405,
422, 247 N.W.2d 385, 395 (1976) (same). Furthermore, the court rejected the Commissioner's
assertion that "in civil proceedings there is no right to counsel." 405 N.W.2d at 288. The court
reasoned that since a refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible in both civil and criminal
proceedings, the civil and criminal consequences are so intermingled that they are not perceptibly
different to lay persons. Id. at 289.
247. 405 N.W.2d at 290. The court determined that if an individual is not provided a
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, a failure to take the test would not constitute a refusal
upon which to revoke a driver's license. Id.
248. Id. ChiefJustice Erickstad and Justice VandeWalle separately dissented from the majority.
opinion. Id. at 290, 291 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting) (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Erickstad contended that there was simply no provision in the North Dakota Century Code which
permitted a person arrested for driving under the influence to consult an attorney prior to
determining whether to undergo a chemical test. Id. at 290 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting). In addition,
Justice VandeWalle stated that the majority had in effect applied the exclusionary rule to a civil
proceeding by holding that the violation of a statutory right of counsel automatically led to the
conclusion that there was no actual refusal to submit to a chemical test. Id. at 291-92 (VandeWalle,
J., dissenting). Justice VandeWalle asserted that there was no particular rationale as to why the
exclusionary rule should apply in civil proceedings and urged caution in extending the rule to civil
proceedings where the right denied is of statutory rather than constitutional origins. Id. at 293-94.
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City of Bismarck v. Bauer
In City of Bismarck v. Bauer,24 9 Bauer appealed from a
conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).
250
Bauer was arrested in April 1985 by a Bismarck Police Officer and
was subsequently charged with DUI. 251 At the police department,
Bauer performed physical tests and submitted to a breath test which
was videotaped. 252 At the municipal court trial, the videotape was
used as evidence and Bauer was convicted of DUI.2 53 Thereafter,
Bauer filed a written notice of appeal to the county court. 254 Prior to
trial, the videotape was inadvertently erased, and consequently,
Bauer moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the grounds
that the inadvertent erasure of the videotape constituted
destruction of exculpatory evidence. 255 The county court denied
Bauer's motion and he was again convicted of DUI.2 56 However,
after the jury had been dismissed, a hesitant juror contacted
Bauer's attorney and the county court judge and told them that
"...guilty was not [her] true and correct verdict. 2 57 Bauer's
attorney then filed a motion for a mistrial.
258
On appeal, Bauer asserted that the county court erred when it
denied Bauer's motion to dismiss based on the inadvertent erasure
of Bauer's videotaped performance of physical tests, and further
that the county court erred when it denied Bauer's motion for a
mistrial based upon the juror's attempt to impeach her earlier
polled verdict of guilty. 259 In affirming the judgment of the county
court, the supreme court stated that the determination of the
propriety of Bauer's motion to dismiss necessarily involved a
determination of whether the erasure of Bauer's videotaped
performance of physical tests constituted suppression of apparent
exculpatory evidence resulting in a deprivation of due process.2 60
Finding the United States Supreme Court's holding in California v.
Trombetta261 dispositive in this case, the court held that the State's
249. 409 N.W.2d90 (N.D. 1987).






256. Id. at 91-92.




261. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). The court noted that the holding in Trombetta was not in conflict with
earlier North Dakota precedent established in State v. Eugene. 409 N.W.2d at 93; see State v. Eugene,
340 N.W.2d 18, 27 (N.D. 1983) (duty to preserve evidence arises only after state knows that the
evidence is material and exculpatory).
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duty to preserve evidence arises only after the State knows or has
reason to know, that the evidence is, or is claimed to be, material
and exculpatory. 262 Accordingly, because the State was not given
notice of Bauer's conclusion that the videotape was exculpatory,
together with the fact that the tape was neither material nor
obviously exculpatory, the court held that reversal of the trial
court's refusal to grant Bauer's motion to dismiss was not
warranted. 2
63
On the issue of Bauer's motion for mistrial because of the
impeached juror's verdict, the court affirmed the general position
that a juror may not impeach the verdict as to matters that inhere
after the jury has been discharged. 264 Accordingly, the lower




City of Fargo v. Case Development Co.
In City of Fargo v. Case Development Co., 266 Case Development
Company (Case) entered into a contract with the city of Fargo to
purchase and redevelop a building. 267 Case also agreed to renovate
the property for use as an office complex and agreed that the
building would have a minimum value for tax purposes of
$1,500,000.268 The agreement provided that if Case breached the
contract after taking possession of the property, the City could
either: (1) take the property back and return all money paid by
Case; or (2) allow Case to retain the property, recover $100,000 as
liquidated damages, and keep the $150,000 that Case had
previously paid the City. 269 The contract also provided that Case
would be in default if it declared an intention to abandon the
project. 27 0 Subsequently, Case informed the City that it would not
be currently feasible to develop the property as an office complex
and, consequently, the City declared Case in default of the
agreement.
271
262. 409 N.W.2d at 93.
263. Id.
264. Id.; see, e.g., Blake v. Cich, 79 F.R.D. 398, 402 (D. Minn. 1978) (juror may not impeach
the verdict as to matters therein after thejury has been discharged).
265. 409 N.W.2d at 94.
266. 401 N.W.2d 529 (N.D. 1987).




271. Id. at 530-31. The City rejected Case's request to develop the property into a minimum-
care elderly housing complex. Id. at 530. In addition, the City declined to consent to an assignment
of Case's interest in the property to another corporation. Id at 530-31.
240 [VOL. 64:211
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The City commenced this action seeking $100,000 in
liquidated damages pursuant to the agreement. 27 2 The trial court
found that Case had declared its intent to abandon and, therefore,
had breached the contract. 273 In addition, the trial court concluded
that the liquidated damages provision was enforceable and awarded
the City the stated amount of $100,000.274 On appeal, Case alleged
that the liquidated damages provision of the contract was
unenforceable as a penalty pursuant to Section 9-08-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code.
271
The supreme court noted that a party seeking to enforce a
liquidated damages provision in a contract has the burden of
proving that the clause is valid as an exception to the general
prohibition of section 9-08-04.276 The court identified three
"foundational facts" which must be considered in determining
whether a particular provision is a valid liquidated damages clause
or a void penalty: (1) whether the damages which might result from
a breach were difficult to estimate at the time the parties executed
the contract; (2) whether there was a reasonable endeavor by the
parties to fix compensation for a breach; and (3) whether the
damages stipulated bear a reasonable relationship to the
anticipated actual damages upon breach. 277 Utilizing these three
factors, the court concluded that none of the trial court's findings
were clearly erroneous and, therefore, could not be overturned on
appeal.278
The supreme court also rejected Case's contention that even if
the three "foundational facts" had been found, the clause should
have been declared invalid as a penalty because it applied to a
variety of breaches with varying degrees of importance. 279 The
court noted that although this type of liquidated damages clause
would not be valid where only a partial breach had occurred, 280 the
272. Id. at 531 .
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-08-04 (1987) (providing that a clause fixing damages for an
anticipated breach is void except where possible damages sustained by a breach would be extremely
difficult to ascertain).
276. 401 N.W.2d at 531 (citing Bowbells Pub. School Dist. No. 14 v. Walker, 231 N.W.2d 173,
178 (N.D. 1975)).
277. Id.; see, e.g., Bowbells Pub.. School Dist. No. 14 v. Walker, 231 N.W.2d 173, 176 (N.D.
1975) (following the South Dakota law that liquidated damages will be sustained if the damages are
difficult to estimate, there was a reasonable endeavor by the parties to fix compensation, and the
amount stipulated is not disproportionate to any damages reasonably to be anticipated); Hofer v. W.
M. Scott Livestock Co., 201 N.W.2d 410, 413 (N.D. 1972) (same). The court noted that these
determinations are questions of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact. 401 N.W.2d at 531 (citing
Eddy v. Lee, 312 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 1981)).
278. 401 N.W.2d at 535.
279. Id. at 534.
280. Id. at 534-35 (citing Raymond v. Edelbrock, 15 N.D. 231, 236, 107 N.W. 194, 196
(1906)).
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clause would be enforceable if a total breach was committed, and if
the damages provision was reasonable as to that particular
breach. 281 Because Case had totally breached the contract, and
because the stipulated sum was reasonably proportionate to the
damages occasioned by the breach, the court concluded that the
damages clause was enforceable as a valid liquidated damages




Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc.
In Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 284 Lucy Bailey and Julie
Lewis appealed from the district court's dismissal of their
complaint for wrongful termination of employment by Perkins
Restaurants, Inc.285 Bailey and Lewis contended that they were
wrongfully discharged because Perkins did not follow dismissal
procedures of the "Progressive Discipline Policy" in Perkins'
employee handbook. 286 The issue on appeal was whether Perkins
was contractually bound by the policy provisions in its
handbook. 2
87
The supreme court stated that in North Dakota when an
employee is hired for an indefinite term, the employment is
presumed to be at will.288 However, the court noted that other
281. Id. at 535.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 398 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1986).
285. Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 120 (N.D. 1986).
286. Id. at 121. The provision regarding Perkins' "Progressive Discipline Policy" provided:
In cases where corrective action is required, we practice a program of progressive
discipline. There are four progressive steps involved in our disciplinary program, as
follows:
1. A verbal warning.
2. A written warning, which is placed in the employee's personnel file.
3. A final written warning and/or possible suspension or probation.
4. Termination, with a copy of the reasons placed on record in the employee's
personnel file.
Id. n.1.
287. 398 N.W.2d at 121.
288. Id. at 122; see, e.g., Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D. 1961)
(employer has the right to discharge his employees with or without cause); Wood v. Buchanan, 72
N.D. 216, 221, 5 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1942) (a general or indefinite hiring is presumed to be a hiring at
will). The court in Sand concluded that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, an employer has
the right to terminate its employees with or without cause. Sand, 108 N.W.2d at 451; see N.D. CENT.
CODE S 34-03-01 (1987) ("[aln employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will
of either party on notice to the other, except when otherwise provided by this title.").
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jurisdictions have created an exception to this presumption and
have held that an employer may be contractually bound by express
or implied promises in employee handbooks with respect to job
security and termination procedures. 289 The court determined
however, that Perkins had disclaimed any possible contractural
obligations arising from thte handbook by printing a clear and
conspicuous disclaimer in their employee handbook. 290 Because the
court found that Bailey and Lewis were employees at will, the court
concluded that Bailey and Lewis failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 291 Therefore, the court affirmed the district
court's decision dismissing the complaint. 
292
Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Association
In Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Association,293  Elmer
Hillesland appealed from a district court summary judgment
dismissing his action against the Federal Land Bank Association of
Grand Forks (the Association) and the Federal Land Bank of St.
Paul (the Bank). 294 Hillesland, the chief executive officer of the
Association, became involved in a land-purchase agreement in
which his sons purchased a debtor of the Association's property.
295
In accordance with standard Association procedure, Hillesland
submitted details of the proposed transaction on a "Prohibited Acts
Report and Action" form to the board of directors for approval.
296
The board approved the transaction, and thereafter Hillesland
submitted the matter to the Bank's Review Committee in St.
Paul. 297 In its report, the Review Committee stated that it was "not
in a position to disapprove" the transaction, but it did express
concern over the appearance of a conflict of interest and prohibited
289. 398 N.W.2d at 122; see, e.g., Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1986)
(rules in handbook are prima facie evidence of an offer for a unilateral contract of employment
modifying the right of the employer to discharge without cause); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wisc. 2d
154, -, 368 N.W.2d 666, 672 (1985) (handbook providing that discharge was only by cause was
an abrogation of an at will relationship).
290. 398 N.W.2d at 123. The disclaimer in Perkins' employee handbook provided: "This
Employee Handbook has been drafted as a guideline for our employees. It shall not be construed to
form a contract between the Company and its employees. Rather, it describes the Company's
general philosophy concerning policies and procedures." Id. at 121.
291. Id. at 123. The plaintiffs also contended that Perkins had violated an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Id. n.2. However, since the plaintiffs had not raised this contention at the
trial level, the court declined to decide the issue. Id.
292. Id. at 123. Justice Levine specially concurred to emphasize that in their appellate brief,
Lewis and Bailey essentially ignored the disclaimer contained in the employee handbook. Id. Thus,
Justice Levine stated that no issues of ambiguity and reliance created by an employer's disclaimer
were resolved in this case. Id. (Levine, J., specially concurring).
293. 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987).





NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
any further direct involvement in the transaction by Hillesland. 29
The sale of the property to Hillesland's sons was completed shortly
thereafter. 299
Subsequently, the Bank launched an investigation into the
transaction and discharged Hillesland stating that he had violated
written standards of conduct, had damaged the image and
reputation of the Association and the Bank, and had exercised poor
business judgment. 30 0 Hillesland then commenced this action
against the Association and the Bank, primarily alleging: (1)
violation of the Farm Credit Act; 30 1 (2) breach of contract; 30 2 and
(3) breach of the implied convenant of good faith and fair
dealing.303 The dispositive issue on appeal was whether the district
court erred in dismissing Hillesland's action.3
04
Initially, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected
Hillesland's contention that an implied private right of action for
wrongful discharge existed under the Farm Credit Act.305 The
court reasoned that the legislative history of the Farm Credit Act
did not provide any relevant indication that Congress intended to
create a private remedy for wrongful discharge on behalf of Farm
Credit System employees. 30 6 Moreover, the court recognized that
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cort v.
Ash307 and subsequent case law interpreting Cort, an implied right
of action under the Farm Credit Act did not exist. 30 8 Consequently,
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 207-08.
301. Id. at 208; see Farm Credit Act, 12 U.S.C. 5 2227(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (providing
appointments, promotions, and separations be made on merit and efficiency, and no political test or
qualification should be permitted or given consideration). Hillesland contended that termination of
Farm Credit System employees without cause was prohibited by section 2227(a)(3) of the Farm
Credit Act. 407 N.W.2d at 208.
302. 407 N.W.2d at 208. Hillesland contended that he was employed permanently, and, thus,
he could be fired only if he did not satisfactorily perform his work. Id. at 211.
303. Id. at 208. Hillesland also alleged age discrimination and tortious interference by the Bank
with his employment contract with the Association. Id. However, the supreme court rejected both
contentions stating that Hillesland failed to provide any evidentiary showing of age discrimination
and that since the Bank had the authority to discharge Hillesland from his employment with the
Association, there was no tortious interference with Hillesland's employment contract. Id. at 215-16.
304. Id. at 208.
305. Id. at 210.
306. Id.
307. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
308. 407 N.W.2d at 208; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). In Cori, the United States
Supreme Court enunciated a four-part test governing the determination of whether a private right of
action "is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one..... Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The Cort test
consists of the following factors: 1) Whether the plaintiff is a person for which the statute was
especially enacted; 2) whether the legislature has explicitly or implicitly indicated their intent to
create or deny a remedy; 3) whether the purposes for which the statute was enacted are consistent
with the implication of a remedy; and 4) whether state law, rather than federal law, has traditionally
governed the recognition of the specific cause of action. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted
that every court which has applied the Cort test has determined that there is no implied right of action
under the Farm Credit Act. Hillesland, 407 N.W.2d at 208.
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in light of the absence of congressional intent to create such an
action and in view of the relevant case law, the supreme court
declined to recognize a private right of action under the Act.30 9
In addition, the supreme court rejected Hillesland's
contention that the Association and the Bank had breached his
employment contract.310 The court determined that under section
34-03-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, Hillesland's
employment was "at will," and, as such, the Association or the
Bank could terminate his employment without cause. 311 Similarly,
the court rejected Hillesland's contention that an implied con-
venant of good faith and fair dealing existed in all employment
contracts. 312 The court noted that although several jurisdictions
have implied a convenant of good faith and fair dealing into
employment contracts, the application of the rule has been far from
uniform. 31 3 Moreover, the court noted that the adoption of an
implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing would effectively
abolish the "at will" rule as applied to this state. 314 Therefore,
because of the inconsistent development and application of the rule,
and in view of the legislative intent in enacting section 34-03-01,
the supreme court refused to recognize an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in cases where an employment contract fails
to provide express terms specifying the duration of employment.31 5





In State v. Schill, 3 17 the defendant appealed from a judgment of
conviction of gross sexual imposition.318 The defendant argued that
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict, and that
some corroboration was necessary to provide sufficient evidence for
the conviction since the sole witness to the alleged act was a seven-
309. 407 N.W.2d at 210.
310. Id. at 211.
311. Id. at 212; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 34-03-01 (1987) (termination of employment at will
requires notice).
312. 407 N.W.2d at 215.
313. See id. at 212-14.
314. Id. at 215.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 216.
317. 406 N.W.2d 660 (N.D. 1987).
318. State v. Schill, 406 N.W.2d 660, 660 (N.D. 1987). Schill was convicted for sexually
abusing his seven-year-old niece. Id. at 661.
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year-old child whose testimony was inconsistent. 31 9 The issue on
appeal was whether the child's testimony establishing the essential
elements of the crime of gross sexual imposition was sufficient to
sustain a conviction.
320
The court noted that a child's tendency to confuse fact and
fantasy has been cited as a reason to bar a child from testifying or to
discard such testimony once given. 32' However, the court stated
that the relationship between age and honesty had not to date been
established, and that, in any event, age was a somewhat arbitrary
test of legal competency to testify. 322 The court further stated that
pursuant to Rule 601 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the
evaluation of a witness is best made by the trier of fact by weighing
the testimony and assessing its credibility, rather than by imposing
prior standards of competency. 323 Moreover, the court noted that
the American Bar Association's legal resource center for child
advocacy has called for the abolishment of the corroboration
requirement of a child's testimony324 and that only a few states have
retained the requirement of corroboration. 325 The court stated that
while a child's uncorroborated testimony may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction for child sexual abuse, the preferred practice is
to support the testimony with as much other evidence as possible. 326
The court then held that the child's testimony in this case
established the essential elements of the crime of gross sexual
imposition and was sufficient to sustain the conviction.3 27
Accordingly, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction.3 28
319. Id. Schill argued that because the child's testimony at trial was so inconsistent with her
prior statements in the interview and deposition, it was insufficient to sustain a felony conviction. Id.
320. Id. at 660.
321. Id. at 661 (citing Whitcomb, Shapiro, and Stellwagen, When the Victim is a Child. Issues for
Judges and Prosecutors, 1985 NAT'L INST. OFJUST. 36).
322. Id. See Whitcomb, Shapiro, and Stellwagen, supra note 321, at 38. The court noted that as
early as 1907, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that an eight-year-old child, the victim of a
rape, was competent to testify as a witness. 406 N.W.2d at 661 (citing State v. Werner, 16 N.D. 83,
89-90, 112 N.W. 60, 62 (1907)).
323. 402 N.W.2d at 662; see N.D.R. EvIo. 601 (every person is competent to be a witness).
324. 406 N.W.2d at 662; see National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Pro-
tection, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, at 33
(ABA Washington, D.C. 1982).
325. 406 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations,
40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 167, 175 (1985)).
326. 406 N.W.2d at 662. The court noted that if the testimony is credible, the uncorroborated
testimony of a child has been held sufficient to sustain a conviction for child sexual abuse. Id. (citing
Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Regarding Necessity for Corroboration of Victim's Testimony In Prosecution
for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4th 120, 148 (1984)).
327. Id. at 662.
328. Id.
246 [VOiL. 64:21 1
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FAMILY LAW
Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven
In Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven,3 29 Sharon Randall (formerly
Vande Hoven) appealed from a supplemental judgment amending
the visitation provisions of her divorce decree and ordering self-
executing contempt penalties against her. 330 On appeal, Sharon
contended that the district court did not have the authority to order
self-executing contempt penalties for future violations of visitation
provisions. 331 In addition, Sharon asserted that the district court
erred in amending the divorce decree to allow Michael Vande
Hoven unsupervised visitation of their children and in assessing
transportation costs for visitation against her.
33 2
The supreme court held that the district court erred in
assessing self-executing contempt penalties against Sharon. 333 The
court noted that where contemptuous conduct occurs out of the
court's presence, the person charged must be given a full
opportunity to appear, explain, and defend his or her actions, and
is entitled to a presumption of innocence. 334 Moreover, the court
reasoned that a trial court may not use a self-executing penalty to
delegate to a private party its adjudicatory contempt powers for
future violations of that order. 335 Additionally, the district court's
order resulted in the assessment of an arbitrary fine payable to
Michael without a determination of whether that amount was
proportional to Michael's actual damages. 336  Therefore, the
supreme court reversed that part of the district court's
supplemental judgment assessing self-executing contempt
penalties against Sharon for future violation of the visitation
provisions. 337
The court also held that the district court did not err in
assessing transportation costs against Sharon or in amending the
329. 399 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1987).
330. Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven, 399 N.W.2d 855, 856 (N.D. 1987). The district court
ordered that Sharon Randall would be fined $5,000 for each failure to comply with the visitation
provisions, and that if she failed to pay the fine, she would forfeit $5,000 of the property settlement.
Id. at 857. In addition, the court ordered that if Sharon did not honor the visitation provisions for a
period of two years, the property settlement would be forfeited in total. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 858-59.
333. Id. at 858.
334. Id. at 857 (citing LePera v. Snider, 240 N.W.2d 862, 867 (N.D. 1976)).
335. Id. at 858; see Gaschk v. Kohler, 70 N.D. 358, 361, 294 N.W. 441, 442 (1940) (accused
could not be committed until she had an opportunity to show she complied with the order or had a
valid excuse for noncompliance); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-14 (Supp. 1987) (court must
make a final order of fine or imprisonment ifa person is found to be in contempt).
336. 399 N.W.2d at 858; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-10-04(1) (1974) (providing civil contempt
fines for actual loss to be paid directly to injured party by wrongdoer).
337. 399 N.W.2d at 858.
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visitation provisions. 338 Sharon initially alleged that the district
court did not have the authority under rule 7(b) of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to make these amendments since
the only relief sought by Michael's motion was a change of
custody. 339 However, the supreme court noted that the primary
purpose of rule 7(b) is to inform parties of the nature of the claims
being asserted against them and the relief demanded by their
adversaries. 340 Therefore, Michael's motion seeking a change of
custody was sufficient to apprise Sharon of possible modification of
his visitation rights and of assessment against her of transportation
costs to facilitate visitation.34 1 Thus, the court affirmed that portion
of the district court's supplemental judgment amending the
visitation provisions of the divorce decree.
34 2
Hanson v. Hanson
In Hanson v. Hanson, 343 James Hanson appealed from a district
court judgment which granted a divorce to Marilyn Hanson.34
The court granted custody of the Hansons' two minor children to
Marilyn. 34 5 Although James was granted visitation rights, the trial
court prohibited him from taking the children to his church or
church services. 34 6 The primary issue on appeal was whether the
district court erred in placing religious restrictions on James'
visitation rights.34 7
The supreme court noted that most courts have refused to
restrain a noncustodial parent from exposing the minor child to his
or her religious beliefs, absent a clear and affirmative showing of
338. Id. at 860.
339. Id. at 858-59; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 7(b) (requirement that applications to the court for orders
be made by motion).
340. 399 N.W.2d at 859; see 5 C. WRIGHT.& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1182 (1969) (discusses the general principles of pleading); cf. Suko v. Suko, 304 N.W.2d 690, 693
(N.D. 1981).
341. 399 N.W.2d at 860.
342. Id. In affirming the district court's judgment amending the visitation provisions, the
supreme court rejected Sharon's assertion that the district court erred in allowing Michael
unsupervised visitation. Id. The court noted that on appeal, an appellant cannot obtain review of the
original divorce proceedings or previous modification proceedings. Id. Thus, since the original
divorce decree and subsequent modification provided for unsupervised visitation, the issue was not
properly before the court. Id.
343. 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987).
344. Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460, 462 (N.D. 1987).
345. Id.
346. Id. During the majority of their marriage, James and Marilyn were members of the Roman
Catholic Church and the children were raised as Catholics. Id. However, prior to the divorce, James
became a member of the Pentecostal Apostolic Church. Id.
347. Id. James also challenged the trial court's awards of spousal and child support, and its
distribution of the property and debts of the parties. Id. at 465. However, since the trial court's
findings were not clearly erroneous, the supreme court affirmed that portion of the trial court's
judgment. Id. at 467.
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possible harm to the child. 348 Moreover, the court stated that to
justify the placement of religious restrictions on visitation rights,
the physical or emotional harm to the child resulting from
conflicting religious practices cannot simply be assumed, but must
be demonstrated in detail. 34 9 The court then determined that the
general testimony in this case that the children were confused and
upset by the duality of their parents' religious beliefs did not clearly
and affirmatively prove any physical or emotional harm to the
children. 350 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that the trial
court's order placing religious restrictions on James' visitation




In Mougey v. Salzwedel,352 Clifford Salzwedel appealed from a
district court judgment which awarded John Mougey damages in
relation to child support expenses John provided for Clifford's
daughter Jodi. 353 John's ex-wife Renee had engaged in an
extramarital relationship with Clifford which resulted in the birth
of.a child (Jodi).3 54 Subsequently, John and Renee were divorced
and a paternity test indicated that John was not Jodi's natural
father. 355 The State of North Dakota commenced proceedings
which determined that Clifford was Jodi's father and ordered him
to pay child support. 356 John then commenced an action in which
he sought compensation from Clifford for the support provided to
Jodi prior to the court's determination that John was not the
natural father.3 57 At the trial court level, judgment was entered in
the amount of $8481.40, and Clifford appealed.3 58
348. Id. at 463; see, e.g., Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, -, 418 N.E.2d 606, 610-12 (1981)
(court reversed judgment modifying visitation provisions of a divorce decree to forbid visitation
unless the father, a Jehovah's Witness, refrained from instructing the children in his religion);
Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash. App. 425, 427-28, 575 P.2d. 1092, 1093 (1978) (same).
349. 404 N.W.2d at 464.
350. Id. at 464-65.
351. Id. at 465. Justice VandeWalle dissented from that part of the majority opinion reversing
the visitation restrictions. Id. at 467 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice VandeWalle reasoned that the trial court imposed the religious restrictions on James'
visitation rights not only to protect the children from emotional trauma but also to preserve the
father-son relationships. Id. at 468. Accordingly, Justice VandeWalle concluded that the testimony
was sufficient to prove possible physical and emotional harm to the children and, thus, the trial
court's opinion was not clearly erroneous. Id.
352. 401 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1987).
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Initially, the supreme court rejected Clifford's contention that
statutory authority for John's claim did not exist.3 59 The court
stated that a stepfather has a civil action against the natural father
for reimbursement of support provided to the child.3 60
Furthermore, the court determined that John's claim was not
barred by the defenses of estoppel, waiver, or laches. 36 1 The court
reasoned that the applicability of these defenses is ultimately
determined on the basis of a stepfather's knowledge regarding
whether or not he was the natural father of the child. 62 Since John
was not sufficiently aware of Jodi'.s paternity, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's determination that the aforementioned
defenses were inapplicable.
363
The supreme court also rejected Clifford's contention that the
trial court applied an incorrect burden of proof regarding John's
knowledge that Jodi was not his natural child. 364 The court
concluded that the trial court acted properly in requiring Clifford to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that John knew as
opposed to suspected that Jodi was not his natural child.3 65 However,
the supreme court held that the trial court erred in awarding John
the costs of attorney's fees and expenses incurred in John's action
to establish his paternity.3 66 The court reasoned that although it is
proper to assess these costs against one of the parties, the reasons
for such an apportionment should be set out by the trial court.
367
Accordingly, because the trial court failed to do so, the supreme
court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to.
consider the apportionment of costs. 
368
359. Id. at 512. Clifford contended thatJohn's claim failed to state a claim for which relief could
be granted. Id. at 511.
360. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-16(1) (1981) (providing that if paternity is established,
the obligation of the father may be enforced by any person who has furnished reasonable expenses for
the support of the child); id. at 5 14-08.1-01 (Supp. 1987) (providing that a person legally responsible
for the support of a minor child is liable for the reasonable value of physical and custodial care or
support which has been furnished by another person); see also id. at § 14-08.1-02 (Supp. 1987)
(providing that the obligation referred to in section 14-08.1-01 may be asserted by a civil action).
361. 401 N.W.2d at 512-13.
362. Id. at 512.
363. Id. at 513. The court also rejected Clifford's assertion that John's action was barred by
accord and satisfaction. Id.
364. Id. at 514.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 515-16.
367. Id. at 516; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-15 (1981) (providing that a court may order
reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and other costs of the action, to be paid by the parties in
proportions determined by the court); see also Herzog v. Yuill, 399 N.W.2d 287, 291-92 (N.D. 1987)
(concluding that the supreme court must be able to discern the trial court's reasoning to
appropriately review the lower court's determination).
368. 401 N.W.2d at 516. Justice Levine concurred with that portion of the majority opinion
remanding the case for a redetermination of the costs and attorney's fees, but dissented from the
remainder of the opinion. Id. at 516-17 (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Specifically, Justice Levine stated thatJohn had reasonable knowledge that he was notJodi's natural
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Martian v. Martian
In Martian v. Martian,369 Nick Martian appealed from a post-
divorce judgment which imposed a constructive trust on the
Martian's jointly-owned home to enforce support and property
division payments due to Betty Martian.3 70  Betty initiated an
action against Nick after he defaulted on her support payments and
also failed to pay her a $10,000 property division installment.3 71 On
appeal, Nick contended that the trial court erred in imposing a
constructive trust upon the marital home since the court was
without statutory authority to impose an implied trust under
section 59-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code.
372
Initially, the supreme court stated that section 59-01-06 is not
an exclusive list of situations which qualify for an equitable
remedy.3 73  In addition the court noted that between former
spouses, a breach of an obligation adjudicated in a divorce
judgment constitutes wrongful conduct which justifies the
imposition of a trust or lien. 374 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that selling property in order to apply the proceeds to an obligation
is the proper method of enforcing such an implied lien.
375
Accordingly, since the decree ordering the sale of the jointly-owned
home to pay amounts due to Betty was the appropriate equitable




In State v. Silseth, 377 Louis Silseth plowed and planted corn on
the entire width of a section line. 378 Consequently, Silseth was
father at the time Jodi was born, and thus, his failure to act on that knowledge for three years
thereafter raised issues of estoppel, waiver, and laches. Id. at 516.
369. 399 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1987).
370. Martian v. Martian, 399 N.W.2d 849, 850 (N.D. 1987). The post-divorce judgment also
reduced Nick's spousal support obligations. Id.
371. Id. at 851. Betty sought to have a constructive trust imposed upon the marital home and
requested that Nick be ordered to vacate the home so that it could be sold, the proceeds applied on
amounts due her, and the remaining proceeds held in trust as security for future payments. Id.
372. Id.; see ND. CENT. CODE § 59-01-06 (1985) (providing specific situations where an implied
trust arises).
373. 399 N.W.2d at 852. The court reasoned that a judicial decree for the sale of property to
apply the proceeds to an adjudicated obligation was well within the range of equitable powers of a
trial court. Id.
374. Id. at 853; see, e.g., Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 243, 380 N.E.2d 189, 195, 408
N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978) (court imposed a constructive trust on life insurance proceeds where ex-
husband breached a provision of the divorce decree).
375. 399 N.W.2d at 853; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08.1-03 (Supp. 1987)(discussing the basis
for attachment of the debtor's property).
376. 399 N.W.2d at 854. Although the court affirmed the trial court's imposition of the
constructive trust, it directed modification of the judgment insofar as it continued a trust on any
remaining proceeds from the sale of the home to pay future spousal support. Id.
377. 399 N.W.2d 868 (N.D. 1987).
378. State v. Silseth, 399 N.W.2d 868, 869 (N.D. 1987).
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convicted of violating section 24-12-02(2) of the North Dakota
Century Code, which provides that "[n]o person shall.. .[w]illfully
and knowingly obstruct or plow up... any public highway or right of
way .... ,37 9 On appeal, Silseth contended that section 24-12-02(2)
did not apply because the section line was a public road and not a
public highway; and that, in any event, as the fee owner on both
sides of the section line, he was entitled to use the property in any
way consistent with the public's easement for travel. 3 80
The supreme court noted that section 24-01-01.1(20) of the
North Dakota Century Code provides that the terms "highway"
and "road" are interchangeable. 381 Therefore, the court concluded
that a section line is a "public highway or right of way" under
section 24-12-02(2).382 Furthermore, the court stated that the
legislature has the power to define what constitutes an interference
with the public's easement,3 83 and that by enacting section 24-12-
02(2), the legislature declared that plowing a section line amounts
to such an interference.38 4 Moreover, the court noted that the
statute unambiguously proscribes the plowing of a section line,
irrespective of whether or to what degree that action obstructs the
section line. 38 5 Accordingly, the supreme court held that Silseth




Szarkowski v. Reliance Insurance Co.
In Szarkowski v. Reliance Insurance Co., 387 Szarkowski appealed
379. Id.; see N*D. CENT. CODE 5 24-12-02(2) (Supp. 1987) (providing that no person may
obstruct any public highway or right of way).
380. 399 N.W.2d at 869-70. Silseth also contended that § 24-12-02(2) did not apply because the
section line involved had not been opened by any governmental action, and therefore, was not a
public highway. Id. at 869. However, the supreme court rejected this contention stating that section
lines outside of incorporated cities are open for public travel and governmental action is not
necessary to open them. Id. (quoting Small v. Burleigh County, 225 N.W.2d 295, 300 (N.D. 1974)).
381. Id. at 869; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 24-01-01.1(20) (1978) (providing that the terms
highway, street or road shall mean a general term denoting a public way of travel and that a highway
in a rural area may be called a road).
382. 399 N.W.2d at 869.
333. Id. at 870 (citing Hjelle v.J.C. Snyder & Sons, 133 N.W.2d 625, 630 (N.D. 1965)).
384. Id.
385. Id. Justice Erickstad concurred with the majority opinion, but cautioned the legislature to
study and possibly amend the statute to permit plowing of section lines when plowing would not
obstruct usual travel on the section line. Id. (Erickstad, J., concurring).
386. Id. Justice Gierke dissented from the majority's affirmation of Silseth's conviction, which
held Silseth criminally responsible for cultivating the property adjacent to and including his section
line. Id. (Gierke, J., dissenting). Justice Gierke was unconvinced that the legislature intended to
make every farmer who cultivates a section line guilty of a criminal offense, regardless of whether the
cultivation in any way obstructs travel by the public. Id. at 872. Therefore, Justice Gierke stated that
Silseth's criminal conviction should have been set aside. Id.
387. 404 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1987).
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from a summary judgment dismissing its action against the
Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance) .388 Szarkowski, a
subcontractor, had entered into an oral agreement to provide
hauling services for Scherbenske Excavating, a general con-
tractor, for which Scherbenske had acquired performance-payment
bonds from Reliance. 38 9 Subsequently, Scherbenske failed to
compensate Szarkowski for the work performed, and Szarkowski
filed suit seeking to recover the debt from Reliance on its surety
bond with Scherbenske or, in the alternative, compensatory and
punitive damages for Reliance's unreasonable and bad faith
conduct in withholding payment.3 90 The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that the statute of limitations precluded
suit on the performance bond claim and that, as a matter of law,
Szarkowski was not entitled to relief on its tort claim.
391
The supreme court determined that the statute of limitations
issue had not been properly preserved for review on appeal.3 9
2
Nevertheless, the court held that the Unfair Insurance Practices
Act applied to sureties3 93 and that Szarkowski had raised a valid
tort claim which required a trial on the merits. 394 The court
reasoned that third party beneficiaries under surety contracts are as
susceptible to unfair and deceptive practices as claimants under
liability insurance policies.3 95 The supreme court then determined
that Reliance owed Szarkowski a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in handling its complaint under the general contractor's
performance bond and, therefore, Szarkowski had a right to bring
an independent tort action against the surety for breach of that
duty. 396  However, because substantial issues of material fact
existed relating to whether Szarkowski was entitled to tort damages
and to whether Reliance could be estopped from asserting
388. Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 502, 503 (N.D. 1987),
389. Id.
390. Id. Szarkowski asserted that it was misled by Reliance into believing that Reliance would
pay Scherbenske's debt when it received proper documentation from Szarkowski. Id. at 507.
Szarkowski further asserted that Reliance failed to respond to the documentation provided and failed
to specify what additional documentation was needed. Id.
391. Id. at 503; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 48-02-17 (Supp. 1987) (claims upon which suit is not
commenced within one year are barred against contractor and its surety).
392. 404 N.W.2d at 503. Szarkowski conceded the applicability of the one-year statute of
limitation before the trial court. Id.
393. Id. at 505; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 26.1-04-03 (1981) (defining unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance business). The court reasoned
that Reliance, in issuing performance bonds for a profit, was engaged in the business of insurance as
to which the provisions of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act applied. Id at 504.
394. 404 N.W.2d at 505.
395. Id. at 504-05; see General Ins. Co. v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, Inc., 174 Cal.
App. 3d 810, , 220 Cal. Rptr. 291, 298 (1985) (obligees under surety contracts are as susceptible
to unfair claim settlement practices as claimants under liability insurance contracts).
. 396. 404 N.W.2d at 505-06.
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the statute of limitatior.s, the court reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.
397
Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Elevator, Inc.
In Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Elevator, Inc., 
398
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm)
appealed from a summary judgment requiring it to defend and
indemnify Farmers Trucking, Inc. and requiring it to pay.
attorney's fees incurred by Farmers Trucking in defending against
State Farm's motion for summary judgment.3 99 Farmers Trucking
had borrowed a truck from Scanson Trucking and the truck was
negligently damaged by an employee of Farmers Trucking.
400
At the time of the accident, Farmers Trucking was insured by State
Farm under a policy which contained a temporary substitute car
provision.40' On appeal, State Farm contended that the temporary
substitute car provision did not cover the borrowed truck which was
involved in an accident, and that even if the borrowed truck did
qualify as a temporary substitute car, other language in the policy
excluded the vehicle because it was "in charge of" the insured.
40 2
The supreme court determined that the temporary substitute
car provision was ambiguous and construed the ambiguity against
State Farm. 403 Thus, the court held that the policy definition of a
temporary substitute car did not, as a matter of law, preclude
liability since the borrowed truck was put to the same use as the
insured truck tractor.40 4 In addition, the court stated that the broad
coverage for property damaged by accident resulting from the
397. Id. at 507.
398. 404 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1987).
399. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Elevator Inc., 404 N.W.2d 473, 474 (N.D. 1987). At
trial, State Farm moved for summary judgment asserting that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
Farmers Trucking. Id. at 475. However, Farmers Trucking filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment contending that State Farm had such a duty and requested that State Farm be ordered to
pay costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.;
see N.D.R. Civ. P. 11 (specifying that an "appropriate sanction," includes an order to pay the other
party reasonable costs incurred because of the filing of a motion in violation of the rule). The trial
court denied State Farm's motion, granted Farmers Trucking's motion and ordered State Farm to
pay Farmers Trucking's attorney's fees. 404 N.W.2d at 475.
400, 404 N.W.2d at 474.
401. Id. at 475-76.
402, Id. at 476-77. State Farm argued that the definition of a "temporary substitute car" as
provided in the policy did not include a truck tractor designed to pull a trailer or a semi-trailer. Id. at
476. Because the borrowed or substitute vehicle was a truck-trailer designed for this purpose, State
Farm contended that it was not a temporary substitute car to which the policy applied. Id.
403. Id. at 477. The court noted that any ambiguity as to the meaning of such a policy was to be
construed against the insurer. Id (citing Emcasco Ins. Co. v. L & M Dev., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 908,
910 (N.D. 1985)).
404. Id.; see 6B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4293:5 (1979 & Supp. 1987) (a
temporary substitute car provision contemplates that the same use will be made of the substitute
vehicle as would have been made of the insured vehicle).
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insured's use of a temporary substitute vehicle was not necessarily
overcome by an exclusion of property "in charge of" an insured.
40 5
Because the policy's exclusion was not clear and explicit, the court
determined that any doubt as to whether State Farm had a duty to
defend and indemnify Farmers Trucking was to be resolved in
favor of the insured, Farmers Trucking.40 6 The court was unable,
however, to review the trial court's order that State Farm pay
Farmers Trucking's attorney's fees because the lower court failed
to state its rationale for that award 7.4 0  The court, therefore,
affirmed the summary judgment and remanded the case for a
redetermination of attorney's fees based upon an expressed
rationale .408
Hoff v. Minnesota Mutual Fire and Casualty
In Hoff v. Minnesota Mutual Fire and Casualty, 40 9 Hoff appealed a
summary judgment granted to Minnesota Mutual Fire and
Casualty Insurance Company, denying Hoff's claim to
compensation under his homeowner's insurance policy for loss
sustained due to theft of personal property from his rented summer
residence. 410 Hoff had purchased a homeowner's insurance policy
which excluded loss by theft which occurred at any premises rented
by the insured unless the loss occurred "while any insured [was]
temporarily residing there.... ,"41, The primary issue on appeal was
whether the insurance company was correct in denying coverage
under the homeowner's policy because Hoff was not "temporarily
residing" at the cottage when the theft occurred. 412
The supreme court indicated that although the phrase
"temporarily residing" did not require the insured to be physically
present at the time of the theft, it did require present use of the
405. 404 N.W.2d at 478. The court noted that State Farm had afforded Farmers Trucking
broad coverage by undertaking to "pay any damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay
because of:.. damage to or destruction of property.. .caused by accident resulting from...use of
your car. " Id. The temporary substitute car provision, the court stated, extended the broad coverage
to substitute vehicles. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 479; see, e.g., Arneson v. City of Fargo, 331 N.W.2d 30, 40 (N.D. 1983) (failure of
trial court to state rationale renders it impossible to review determination on appeal).
408. 404 N.W.2d at 479. Justice Meschke, although concurring in the opinion, noted that he
would affirm the award of attorney's fees below as well as award them on appeal. Id. (Meschke, J.,
concurring).
409. 398 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1986).
410. Hoff v. Minnesota Mut. Fire and Casualty, 398 N.W.2d 123, 124 (N.D. 1986).
411. Id. at 124-25.
412. See id. at 124. Hoff testified that he spent half of his time during the summer at the rented
lake cottage and the other half at his primary residence, a condominium in West Fargo, North
Dakota. Id. Hoff also testified that he had left the cottage on a Monday or Tuesday and the theft was
not discovered until the following Friday. Id.
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cottage on the date of the theft. 413 The court noted that the purpose
of the policy was to protect a residence that was being used at all
times, and not to protect an unattended premises that was more
susceptible to theft. 414 Therefore, since Hoff was not temporarily
residing at the cottage when the theft occurred, his loss was not
covered by the insurance policy. 4 15 The court noted that although
this was a case of first impression in the State of North Dakota, a
number of jurisdictions applied the same interpretation to language
almost identical to that of the policy in this case.41 6 Therefore, the
summary judgment in favor of the insurance company was
affirmed and no coverage of the loss was required. 417
MORTGAGES
Bank of Steele v. Lang
In Bank of Steel v. Lang,41 8  the defendant Lang had
executed a promissory note to the Bank of Steele (Steele) to renew a
prior debt and to obtain two cash advances. 41 9 To secure payment
of the prior debt, Steele perfected a security interest in Lang's farm
equipment, livestock, crops, and proceeds.420 Lang also gave Steele
a real estate mortgage on his farmland as additional collateral for
the renewal and advances. 4 2' However, this mortgage was second
in priority to a mortgage held by the Bank of North Dakota.4 22 The
Bank of North Dakota then foreclosed its real estate mortgage,
purchased the farmland, and assigned its sheriff's certificate of sale
413. Id. at 125.
414. Id. at 126. The court noted that the insurance policy was meant to provide indemnification
to an insured for damage to property occurring at a described premise and not to protect the insured
against the increased risks which accompany an unattended domicile in which the insured may have
some property. Id.; see 10A M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 5§ 42:122-23, 42:128, 42:540,
42:552-53 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1987).
415. 398 N.W.2d at 126. The court indicated that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for the insurance company. Id. at 127. Furthermore, since the insurance
company properly withheld coverage under the policy, the court stated it did not need to address the
merits of Hoffs contention that he was entitled to punitive damages because of the insurance
company's bad faith. Id.
416. Id. at 126; see, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barber, 41 Ala. App. 552, -_, 139 So. 2d 126,
128 (1962) (loss not covered because no one was residing in seasonal residence at the time the theft
occurred); Springman v. Pacific Ins. Co., 5 Il1. App. 3d 604, -, 283 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1972)
(insureds were not temporarily residing at seasonal dwelling when thefts occurred); Reiner v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ill. App. 2d 210, -, 245 N.E.2d 655, 657 (1969) (insured
student's loss not covered because she had moved home for the summer and was not residing in
college apartment when loss occurred).
417. 398 N.W.2d at 127.
418. 399 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1987).





to Steele. 423 Subsequently, Lang defaulted on his promissory note
and Steele initiated this action.4 2 4 The trial court granted Steele a
money judgment on the promissory note, foreclosed Steele's
security interest in Lang's personal property, and dismissed Lang's
counterclaim for fraud and for violation of the Corporate Farming
Law. 425 Lang appealed and the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision.
4 26
Lang contended that the trial court erred in concluding that
Steele was not in violation of the Corporate Farming Law.
427
Specifically, Lang asserted that the trial court erred by retaining
jurisdiction on the corporate farming issue when it declined
jurisdiction to decide issues concerning Lang's title to his former;
real estate.4 28 However, the supreme court noted that a court has
broad discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence and
concluded that the trial court was not prohibited from rendering
judgment on the corporate farming issue. 429 Furthermore, the
court held that Steele did not violate the Corporate Farming Law,
as there was no statute which prohibited a corporation, in
perfecting its security interest, from purchasing an assignment of a
sheriff's certificate of sale to real property.
43 0
The supreme court also rejected Lang's contention that Steele
was required to redeem its real estate rather than purchase the
sheriff's certificate of sale from the Bank of North Dakota.4 31 The
court reasoned that Lang, as judgment debtor, was not a
"redemptioner" to whom a second mortgagee was required to give
423. Id. The Bank of North Dakota purchased Lang's farmland at the sheriff's sale for





427. Id. at 295. Lang also contended that the trial court erred in denying his demand for a jury
trial. Id. at 297. However, the supreme court held that Lang waived his right to trial by jury because
he failed to file within ten days of the Bank of Steele's reply. Id. at 298; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 38(b)
(requiring a party's demand for a jury trial be served within ten days after service of the last
pleading).
428. 399 N.W.2d at 295. Lang attempted to establish that the Bank of Steele was in violation of
the corporate farming law by offering into evidence documents relating to questions of title in his
former real estate. Id. The Bank of Steele objected to the introduction of the documents on relevancy
grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. Id.
429. Id. The court also noted that the documents Lang attempted to submit could not have
affected the trial court's conclusion. Id.
430. Id. at 296; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-09-47(4) (1983) (permitting a secured creditor, whose
security encompasses both real and personal property to commence a separate action to proceed
against the personal collateral); see also N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-06-13(4) (Supp. 1987) (permitting a
corporation to acquire farmland as security for indebtedness by any lien enforcement procedure).
431. 399 N.W.2d at 297. Lang asserted that the Bank of Steele was required to file notice of
redemption and to credit any equity in his former real estate against his indebtedness on the
promissory note. Id. at 296; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-24-03 (Supp. 1987) (notice of redemption).
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notice of redemption. 432 Therefore, Lang's sole remedy was to
redeem the real estate within the one year period of redemption as
provided in section' 28-24-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code.
433
Schiele v. First National Bank
In Schiele v. First National Bank,434 the First National Bank
loaned Edward and Alice Schiele (the Schieles) $135,000.4 3 5 The
Schieles executed a promissory note secured by both a real estate
mortgage on their home and by an assignment of their interest as
mortgagees in a farm mortgage. 436 In April 1981, the Schieles
defaulted on the note and the First National Bank foreclosed on
their home.4 37  The foreclosure judgment determined that
$140,187.13 was currently due on the mortgage.438  At the
foreclosure sale, First National bid $75,000 for the home.4 39 The
Schieles contended that the foreclosure sale of their home fully
satisfied First National's mortgage and, therefore, the Schieles
moved for post judgment relief, requesting the return of their farm
mortgage.4 4 0 When the trial court denied their motion,4 41 the
Schieles commenced this separate action against First National
seeking reassignment of their farm mortgage. 442 The trial court
granted summary judgment to First National, holding that the
foreclosure against the home did not fully satisfy the debt and that
North Dakota's anti-deficiency statutes did not preclude First
National from enforcing the assignment of the farm mortgage to
pay the balance of the debt.
44 3
On appeal, First National contended that res judicata barred
the Schieles' action because the issues were necessarily involved in
the foreclosure action.4 4 4 The court rejected this argument and
432. 399 N.W.2d at 297; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (definition of
redemption).
433. 399 N.W.2d at 297; see N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 28-24-02 (Supp. 1987) (payment on end of
period of redemption).
434. 404 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1987).
435. Schiele v. First Nat'l Bank, 404 N.W.2d 479, 480 (N.D. 1987).
436. Id. at 480. At the time of the transaction, First National appraised the loanable value of the
home at $85,000 and the farm mortgage at $50,000 although the home was then valued at a total of
$113,000 and the principal amount of the farm mortgage was $150,000. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. The judgment ordered foreclosure sale of the home and stated that no deficiency
judgment was granted. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id
441. Id. The trial court denied the Schieles' motion, ruling that the issue involved was not
properly in controversy and, therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to make a decision. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 480-81. The trial court relied on the Sheriff's report of the foreclosure sale to hold that
$69,250.59 was still due First National, Id. at 481.
444. Id.
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concluded that the prior judgment of foreclosure against the home
was not res judicata on the status of the farm mortgage because the
status of that farm mortgage was not actually litigated and decided
in the prior action. 445 In addressing the ability of First National to
enforce the assignment of the farm mortgage to pay the balance of
the debt, the court noted that the Schieles' assignment of the real
estate mortgage as security for their own debt was not a transaction
governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 446
Therefore, the court concluded that both the home and the
assignment of the farm mortgage were real property collateral
subject to the rights and remedies of the real property laws.
447
The supreme court also rejected the Schieles' contention that
the foreclosure of their home fully satisfied First National's
mortgage. 448 The court noted that although First National was free
to foreclose upon the home mortgage without simultaneously
foreclosing on the assignment of the farm mortgage, the anti-
deficiency statutes required that the fair value of the foreclosed
home be determined by a jury before First National could enforce
the remaining debt against the farm mortgage. 449 Accordingly, the
supreme court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the
case to the district court for a jury determination of the difference
between the fair market value of the home and the amount of the
debt remaining due after the foreclosure sale.
450
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Butts Farming Association
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Butts Farming Association,451 Butts
445. Id. The court noted that the record established that in the prior foreclosure action, the trial
court declined to address the return of the farm mortgage because that issue was not properly in
controversy. Id.
446. Id. at 483. In determining that the assignment of the mortgage was not a transaction
subject to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court noted that section 41-09-04(10) of
the North Dakota Century Code [U.C.C. 9-104(0)] provided that Chapter 9 did not apply to the
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate. Id. at 482; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-09-
04(10) (Supp. 1987) (list of transactions that are not secured transactions). In addition, the court
stated that other jurisdictions have decided this issue in the same manner. 404 N.W.2d at 482; see,
e.g., In re Bristol Assocs., Inc., 505 F.2d 1056, 1064 (3rd Cir. 1974) (holding that assignment ofa real
estate lease was not a transaction governed by the secured transactions chapter of the Uniform
Commercial Code); Rucker v. State Exch. Bank, 355 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(same).
447. 404 N.W.2d at 483.
448. Id. at 484-85. The Schieles asserted that by retaining possession of the farm mortgage, First
National had, in substance, obtained a deficiency judgment, although it did not in fact obtain such a
judgment. Id. at 484. Conversely, First National contended that the anti-deficiency statutes did not
apply to the assignment of the farm mortgage, and did not preclude it from receiving the difference
between the total amount of the adjudicated debt and the amount it bid at the Sheriff's sale because
that difference could be calculated without further action orjudgment. Id.
449. Id. at 485; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (requiring that before any judgment can
be rendered for an action brought for a deficiency judgment, the determination of the fair value of
the premises must be submitted to ajury).
450. 404 N.W.2d at 485.
451. 406 N.W.2d.662 (N.D. 1987).
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Farming Association (BFA) appealed from a summary judgment
granting the Prudential Insurance Company (Prudential)
foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate owned by BFA.
452
Previously, a bankruptcy court had determined that BFA's
outstanding debt exceeded the fair market value of the real estate
securing the debt.453 At trial, BFA raised confiscatory price
defenses and requested appropriate relief from the court.
454
However, the trial court determined that the confiscatory price
defenses were not applicable and BFA appealed.
455
The supreme court noted that the fact that an outstanding
indebtedness exceeds the value of mortgaged collateral may be
important in a trial court's discretionary determination to grant or
deny the mortgagor's request for relief. 45 6 However, the court
reasoned that this factor alone should not be used as the basis for
denying a mortgagor an opportunity to demonstrate a factual basis
for relief under the confiscatory price defenses. 457 Accordingly, the
supreme court held that the trial court erred in concluding that
when the outstanding indebtedness exceeds the market value of the
mortgaged property, the confiscatory price defenses afforded to the
mortgagor are, as a matter of law, inapplicable. 458 Therefore,
because the trial court improperly granted Prudential summary
judgment foreclosure, the supreme court reversed the trial court
decision and remanded the case.
459
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Hennum v. City of Medina
In Hennum v. City of Medina,460 Hennum, a city employee, was
terminated from his position by Ernest Moser, the mayor of
Medina, and his dismissal was later affirmed by the Medina City
Council. 461 Subsequently, Hennum brought suit against the city
452. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Butts Farming Ass'n, 406 N.W.2d 662, 663 (N.D. 1987).
453. Id. BFA filed for, but was denied, reorganization underchapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. SS 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (providing for bankruptcy by
reorganization).
454. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-04 (1974) (confiscatory price defenses).
455. 406 N.W.2d at 663. The trial court concluded that since BFA no longer had "an interest in





460. 402 N.W.2d 327 '(N.D. 1987).
461. Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327, 328 (N.D. 1987). Hennum was employed
on July 14, 1980, by action of the Medina City Council. Id. Mayor Moser terminated Hennum's
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for breach of his employment contract and against Mayor Moser
for tortious interference with contract and for the termination of his
employment without due process. 462 The district court determined
that there had been a breach of Hennum's employment contract
when Hennum was terminated by Mayor Moser, however, the
court limited the damages to that period of time between the date
Mayor Moser terminated Hennum's employment and the date the
city council approved the Mayor's action. 463 In addition, the court
concluded that Mayor Moser had been without legal authority to
terminate Hennum's employment and, therefore, committed the
tort of intentional interference with contractual relations.4 64 Both
parties appealed.
465
The supreme court noted that Mayor Moser was without legal
authority to terminate Hennum's employment without council
approval because such authority was not expressly or impliedly
conferred upon the mayor by applicable law or by the council.
466
However, the court held that damages were correctly limited for the
breach of Hennum's employment contract because the city council
possessed the necessary authority to ratify the unauthorized
termination. 467 The court also determined that Hennum, as an at-
will employee, did not have a constitutionally protected property
right in continued employment under the due process clauses of the
United States Constitution. 468 Finally, the court reversed the lower
court on the issue of tortious interference with contract, and
remanded the case for a determination as to whether Moser acted
in good faith and in the best interests of the city.
469
employment as the city maintenance person on February 28, 1985, and the council affirmed this
termination on April 27, 1985. Id.
462. Id. Hennum also alleged violations of his right to privacy and age discrimination. Id. at
329.
463. Id. at 330.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 333.
467. Id. The supreme court noted that Mayor Moser's termination of Hennum's employment
was ultra vires, but the termination would not have been ultra vires if done by the council. Id. Thus,
the city council could ratify Mayor Moser's unauthorized termination of Hennum's employment
because it was within the municipal corporation's authority to remove him. Id.
468. Id. at 335. The court stated Hennum had to have more than a unilateral expectation of
continued employment; rather, he had to possess a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Id. (citing
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972)). The court distinguished between at-will
employees and those who have some protection due to their property interest in continued
employment. 402 N.W.2d at 335.
469. Id. at 338-39. The'court relied on the Restatement definition of intentional interference
with another's performance of his or her contract and concluded that liability is to be imposed only if
the defendant intends to interfere with the plaintiff's contractual relations. Id.; see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A comment e (1979) (discussing the required intent necessary for
intentional interference with contractual relations). The court determined that whether Moser
acted in good faith and in the best interests of the City of Medina was relevant to the determination of
tortious interference with contractual relations and that the district court erred in excluding such
evidence in conjunction with this inquiry. 402 N.W.2d at 339.
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OIL AND GAS
Imperial Oil of North Dakota, Inc. v. Industrial Commission
In Imperial Oil of North Dakota, Inc. v. Industrial Commission,
4 70
Imperial Oil of North Dakota (Imperial Oil) appealed from a
district court judgment affirming the Industrial Commission's
(Commission) order determining that interest expense was a
reasonable actual cost of drilling and operating a well. 47 1 A dispute
arose between Flying J Exploration and Production (Flying
J), the operator of the well Skjelvik #4-35, and Imperial Oil as to
whether interest expense was an actual cost of drilling and
operating the well. 472 The Commission entered an order requiring
nonconsenting owners to pool their ownership interests with the
operating owners for the development and operation of the spacing
unit for the well. 473 In addition, the Commission determined that
interest expenses were an actual cost of drilling operations and
ordered Imperial Oil to reimburse Flying J for its share of the
interest costs at an annual rate of 12.72 percent. 474 The dispositive
issue on appeal was whether section 38-08-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code allows the operator of a well to recover interest
expense from nonconsenting owners as part of the reasonable
actual cost of drilling and operating a well.
475
The supreme court noted that interest expense incurred by
operators in drilling and operating a well is a business risk.
476
Therefore, the court reasoned that interest expenses incurred, like
extraordinary royalty interests, are additional deductions from the
drilling party's profits in situations where a nonconsenting owner
470. 406 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1987).




475. Id. at 702; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1987). Section 38-08-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides in pertinent part:
1 ... [i]n the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission upon the application of
any interested person shall enter an order pooling all interests in the spacing unit
for the development and operations thereof....
2. Each pooling order must make provisions for the drilling and operation of a well on
the spacing unit, and for the payment of the reasonable actual cost thereof by the
owners of interests in the spacing unit, plus a reasonable charge for supervision. In
the event of any dispute as to such costs the commission shall determine the proper
costs....
Id.
476. 406 N.W.2d at 703 (citing Anderson, Compulsory Pooling in North Dakota: Should Production
Income and Expenses Be Divided From Date of Pooling, Spacing, or "First-runs?" 58 N.D.L. REv. 537, 567




has had her "interests in the spacing unit" pooled against her will
under section 38-08-08.477 Furthermore, the court rejected the
contention that its decision would have a significant impact on
working interest owners faced with deciding whether to
voluntarily pool their ownership interests.4 7 8 The court reasoned
that owners have an incentive to voluntarily pool their ownership
interests even if interest costs cannot be assessed against
nonconsenting owners, because owners who voluntarily pool their
ownership interests have control over the cost of drilling.
4 79
Accordingly, the court concluded that section 38-08-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code did not authorize the Commission to order a
nonconsenting owner to reimburse the operator of a well for
interest expenses on the nonconsenting owner's share of the costs of
drilling and operating the well.
4 0
Phillips Natural Gas Co. v. State Board of Equalization
In Phillips Natural Gas Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 4 81 the
plantiff pipeline owners brought an action against the State of
North Dakota in which they sought to recover ad valorum taxes
levied upon their pipelines pursuant to an assessment by the State
Board of Equalization (Board).4 8 2 The district court determined
that the pipelines were not subject to assessment by the Board, but
constituted real property subject to local assessment, and both
parties appealed.4 8 3 The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the
pipelines were subject to central assessment by the Board; and (2) if
not subject to central assessment, whether the pipelines constituted
real property subject to local assessment or personal property
exempt from taxation.
4 814
The supreme court noted that all property in North Dakota is
subject to taxation unless specifically exempted by law.
485
Furthermore, the court determined that article X, section 4 of the
477. 406 N.W.2d at 703 (citing 5 W. SUMMERS OIL AND GAS S 974(1966)).
478. Id.
479. Id. The court noted that most owners would prefer to determine costs by contract rather
than have disputed costs determined by the Commission. Id. at 703-04.
480. Id. at 704. Justice Meschke dissented from the majority's classification of interest expense
as a business risk. Id. (Meschke, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Meschke stated that interest
expense for drilling and operating a well should be considered a "reasonable actual cost" for the
Commission to allocate to fractional operating interest which is involuntarily pooled under section
38-08-08. Id.
481. 402 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 1987).
482. Phillips Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 402 N.W.2d 906, 907 (N.D. 1987).
The plaintiffs' pipelines transported either crude oil or natural gas. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-03 (1983) ("[aIll property in this state is subject to
taxation unless expressly exempted by law."); see also Tyler v. Cass County, 1 N.D. 369, 382, 48
N.W. 232, 233 (1890) ("[t]axation is a rule; freedom from taxation is the exception").
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North Dakota Constitution authorizes assessment by the Board of
each property constituting a linear transportation system which
ordinarily extends through more than one geographical taxing
district. 486  In implementing the constitutional authorization
provided in article X, section 4, the supreme court stated that the
legislature authorized central assessment of the plaintiffs' pipelines
by the State Board of Equalization by enacting chapter 57-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 487 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' pipelines constituted linear transportation
systems which extended through more than one geographical
taxing district and, thus, were subject to central assessment by the
Board. 4
88
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v. Conrad
In Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v. Conrad, 489 natural gas
processors (the taxpayers) commenced a declaratory judgment
proceeding to enjoin the North Dakota State Tax Commissioner
(Commissioner) from assessing North Dakota sales tax upon
"plant fuel" consumed in the operation of certain natural
processing facilities.4 90  The taxpayers contended that the
Commissioner did not have the statutory authority to assess sales or
use tax upon the plant fuel used by gas processing plants in North
Dakota because: (1) the transaction by which plant fuel was
obtained was not a "retail sale" within the meaning of section 57-
39.2-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code since the plant fuel
was not acquired by "sale" ;491 (2) plant fuel was excluded from the
definition of "retail sale" under the "for processing or for resale
486. 402 N.W.2d at 909; see N.D. CONST. art. X, 5 4 (providing that property, used directly or'.
indirectly in the carrying of persons, property or messages shall be assessed by the State Board of
Equalization in a manner provided by law).
487. 402 N.W.2d at 911; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-06-01 (1983) (providing that the provisions
of chapter 57-06 shall govern the assessment of the property of any public utility company defined in
section 57-06-02); id. at § 57-06-02 (Supp. 1987) (providing the definition of a pipeline company); id.
at § 57-06-05 (Supp. 1987) (providing that State Board of Equalization shall assess all operative
property of pipeline companies).
488. 402 N.W.2d at 911. Justice VandeWalle concurred only in the result reached by the
majority opinion. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Justice VandeWalle stated that although the
majority's conclusion that article X, section 4 applied to linear transportation systems extending
through multiple geographical taxing districts was logical, the majority's construction added a
limitation not specifically contained in the wording of that constitutional provision. Id.
489. 405 N.W.2d 279 (N.D. 1987).
490. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Conrad, 405 N.W.2d 279, 280 (N.D. 1987).
491. Id. at 281; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-39.2-02.1 (Supp. 1987) (providing for the imposition
of a tax on all sales at retail). Because their standard "gas purchase contracts" did not attempt to
quantify the amount of plant fuel that may be used by the processors without charge, nor provided
for a separate charge to the processors for the utilization of plant fuel, the taxpayers contended that
the incidental use of plant fuel under these circumstances did not constitute a "retail sale" as defined
by section 57-39.2-01(7). 405 N.W.2d at 281; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-39.2-01(7) (Supp. 1987)
(definition of retail sale).
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exclusion" provided in section 57-39.2-01(7) of the North Dakota
Century Code; 492 and (3) section 57-39.2-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code precluded assessment of sales or use taxes on plant
fuel. 4
93
On appeal, the supreme court held that the transaction by
which the processors obtain plant fuel constituted a sale. 494 The
court reasoned that the term "sale" is broadly defined by section
59-39.2-01(9) as "any transfer of title or possession, exchange or
barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means
whatever for a consideration.... ,,495 The court stated that while a
specific price is not allocated to the plant fuel used by the taxpayers,
possession of natural gas passed from the producers to the
taxpayers for a consideration and, thus, the transaction constituted
a sale. 496 Moreover, the court noted that a "retail sale" is defined
as the sale of tangible personal property to a consumer. 497.Because
the taxpayers were the consumers of the plant fuel at issue, the
court held that the transaction was within the definition of "sale"
and "retail sale" provided in section 57-39.2-01.498
The supreme court also rejected the taxpayers' contention that
the plant fuel was excluded from the definition of "retail sale"
under section 57-39.2-01(7). 499 The court reasoned that the plant
fuel used by the processors in their operation did not become an
ingredient or component part of other products intended to be sold
ultimately at retail. 50 0 Moreover, the court noted that the plant fuel
was consumed by the processors and was never resold.50 1
Therefore, the court held that the plant fuel used by the processors
was not personal property that was "processed" and, thus, the
exclusion "for processing or for resale" did not apply. 50 2
492. 405 N.W.2d at 282; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-39.2-01(7) (Supp. 1987) (providing that a
sale "for processing or for resale" is not a retail sale).
493. 405 N.W.2d at 283; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-04 (Supp. 1987) (providing that gross
receipts upon which the state imposes a special tax are exempt from sales or use taxes).
494. 405 N.W.2d at 281.
495. Id. at 281-82; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-39.2- 01(9) (Supp. 1987) (definition of sale).
496. 405 N.W.2d at 282. The court reasoned that the taxpayers received raw gas from the
producers which was processed and, with the exception of the plant fuel used by the processing
facilities, resold to third parties. Id. In addition, the court noted that in return, the producers
received consideration in the form of a percentage of the proceeds from those sales. Id.
497. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE S 5 7 -3 9 .2 -01( 7 )(Supp. 1987) (definition of retail sale).




502. Id. In so holding, the supreme court rejected the taxpayers' contention that such an
interpretation would retroactively convert the sale of raw gas "for processing or for resale" into a
retail sale if and when such gas was used in the processing facilities. Id. The court relied on an Illinois
case holding that refinery fuels were subject to use taxes. Id.; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Johnson, 93
Ill. 2d 126, 442 N.E.2d 846, 850 (1982).
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Finally, the court rejected the taxpayers' contention that
because plant fuel was subject to a "special tax," namely, oil and
gas gross production tax, it was exempt from sales or use taxes
under section 57-39.2-04.5 03 The court noted that section 57-51-03
of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "the gross
production tax shall not be in lieu of income taxes nor excise taxes
upon the sale of oil and gas products as [sic] retail.
50 4
Because the legislature had expressly provided that the gross
production tax was not in lieu of excise taxes, the court held that the
legislature did not intend to exempt plant fuel from sales or use
taxes under the exemption provided by section 57-39.2-04.505
Therefore, the court concluded that the plant fuel at issue was not
exempt from sales or use taxes and, accordingly, affirmed the
judgment of the district court. 
5 06
Arnerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad
In Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad,507 the North Dakota State Tax
Commissioner (Commissioner) assessed additional oil and gas
production taxes, penalties, and interest against the Amerada Hess
'Corporation (Amerada). 50 1  Amerada filed an administrative
complaint objecting to the assessment and filed a declaratory
judgment action in district court.5 0 9 The district court ruled in
favor of the Commissioner and Amerada appealed, asserting that
the Commissioner: (1) had misinterpreted the meaning of "gross
value at the well"; 510 (2) had erroneously denied Amerada a tax
exemption for residue gas used as a lease fuel; 511 (3) was estopped
503. 405 N.W.2d at 283.
504. Id. at 283-84; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51-03 (1983) (gross production tax is to be in lieu
of other taxes).
505. 405 N.W.2d at 284.
506. Id. Justice VandeWalle dissented from the majority opinion stating that under North
Dakota statutes, the gas used by plant processors in their operations is not subject to the use or sales
tax. Id. (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). Justice VandeWalle contended that the transaction did not
constitute a sale and, even if it did, it was exempt from taxation under the "for processing or for
resale" exclusion contained in the definition of a "sale" embodied in section 57-39.2-01(7). Id.
507. 410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987).
508. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad, 410 N.W.2d 124, 126 (N.D. 1987).
509. Id. In connection with the district court action, Amerada obtained a writ of prohibition
restraining the Commissioner from pursuing the administrative complaint until Amerada's claim for
declaratory relief had been resolved. Id.
510. Id. at 127; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51-02 (1983) (providing that a gross production tax of
five percent of the gross value at the well is to be levied upon all oil and gas produced in North
Dakota). The parties agreed that the phrase "gross value at the well" meant the fair market value of
the gas. 410 N.W.2d at 128. The disagreement arose over the method for determining the fair
market value of the gas when it was sold pursuant to a long-term purchase contract. Id.
511. 410 N.W.2d at 130; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51-05(3) (1983) (providing a tax exemption
for "[g]as when.. used for fuel or otherwise used in the operation of any lease or premises in the
drilling for or production of oil or gas therefrom...."). The Commissioner asserted that residue gas
used as a lease fuel did not qualify for the exemption because the term "gas" meant only "natural
gas and casinghead gas." 410 N.W.2d at 130.
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by his conduct from assessing additional taxes, penalties, and
interest;51 2 and (4) was barred by the six-year statute of limitations
from making any assessment for the period before January 1,
1979.513
The supreme court determined that "gross value at the well"
as used in section 57-51-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
meant the fair market value of the gas at the time of production.
5 14
The court reasoned that although the actual contract price of gas
produced and sold is generally one of the best indicators of the fair
market value of gas, the legislature intended to levy the gross
production tax on the current fair market value of the gas
produced. 515 The court then ascertained the meaning of the term
"gas" and concluded that the obvious purpose of section 57-51-
05(3) was to provide a tax exemption for gas used in lease
operations regardless of whether the gas has had its liquid
hydrocarbons or impurities removed by processing. 516 Therefore,
the supreme court determined that the district court erred in
holding that the residue gas Amerada used as a lease fuel was not
eligible for tax-exempt status.
517
The supreme court also determined, as a matter of law, that
Amerada failed to establish estoppel against the Commissioner. 51
The court reasoned that the Commissioner's acceptance of
Amerada's tax returns without objection did not estop the
Commissioner from assessing additional taxes.5 19 Moreover, the
court stated that the Commissioner was not estopped because of his
512. 410 N.W.2d at 132. Amerada contended that the Commissioner's prior conduct of writing,
several letters, accepting Amerada's tax returns, and failing to promulgate any regulations
governing the valuation of gas estopped him from assessing the additional tax. Id.
513. Id. at 135. The district court held that the six-year statute of limitations was applicable to
an assessment of additional taxes, penalties, and interest pursuant to chapter 57-51 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id. at 127. The Commissioner, however, contended that the six-year statute
of limitations wak§ a restriction on his authority, and not on his remedy; thus, since a restriction on
the time within which the Commissioner must issue an assessment is not a true statute of limitations,
the Commissioner asserted that the district court improperly imposed the general statute of
limitations where the legislature had not expressly limited his authority. Id. at 135.
514. Id. at 129. Amerada asserted that where the contract price reflects the highest price
obtainable for gas of like kind, quality, and character in the field at the time the contract was entered
into, the contract price exclusively establishes the fair market value of the gas for gross production
tax purposes. Id. at 128. The Commissioner based his assessment on the fair market value of the gas
at the time of production and used the "work-back" method to arrive at his calculations. Id. at 127.
Because the Commissioner may use any method of valuing gas that is reasonably calculated to
arrive at the fair market value of the gas, the court had no basis to void the Commissioner's
assessment. Id. at 130.
515. Id. at 129.
516. Id. at 131-32.
517. Id. at 132.
518. Id. at 135.
519. Id. at 133. The court noted that the mere failure to collect a tax was not sufficient to estop a
tax authority from subsequently demanding the payment of a tax. Id.; see, e.g., Hutchinson Bros.
Excavating Co. v. District of Columbia, 511 A.2d 3, 7 (D.C. 1986) (a tax collector's error or decision
not to collect a particular tax gives no "right" to its perpetuation).
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failure to duly promulgate rules or regulations governing the
valuation of gas at the time in question. 20 Finally, the court
determined that it was clear that the gross production tax
constituted a "liability created by statute" 521 and, therefore, the
general six-year statute of limitations applied to the assessment. 
522
SCHOOLS
Elliot v. Drayton Public School District No. 19
In Elliot v. Drayton Public School District No. 19,523 the plaintiff
election contestants appealed from a judgment dismissing their
action against the Drayton Public School District and
from an order denying their motion for relief from the judgment.
524
The plaintiffs challenged a special mill levy election alleging illegal,
erroneous or fraudulent voting. 525 The plaintiffs served the clerk of
the school district with a summons and an election contest
complaint on the fourteenth day following the final canvassing.
526
However, the school board members were not served until the
fifteenth day following the final canvassing. 527 At the trial court
level, the plaintiffs' action was dismissed because it was barred by
the plaintiffs' failure to commence the action by serving the school
board members within the fourteen day limit for an election contest
under section 16.1-16-04 of the North Dakota Century Code. 528 On
appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the election contest action was
properly commenced under section 28-01-38 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which provided a continuation provision.
529
520. Id. at 133.
521. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01-16(2) (Supp. 1987) (providing a six-year statute of
limitations for actions upon a liability created by statute).
522. 410 N.W.2d at 136. Justice VandeWalle dissented from the majority's opinion insofar as it
appeared to approve the Commissioner's method of determining the fair market value of the gas for
purposes of the gross production tax. Id. at 137, 139 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).
523. 406 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1987),
524. Elliot v. Drayton Pub. School Dist. No. 19, 406 N.W.2d 655, 655-56 (N.D. 1987).
525. Id. at 656; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-16-05(2) (1981) (an election contest may be
commenced because of illegal votes or erroneous or fraudulent voting).
526. 406 N.W.2d at 656.
527. Id.
528. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-04 (Supp. 1987) (providing that any action to contest
an election must be commenced within fourteen days after final canvassing). The trial court
determined and the supreme court agreed that in an action challenging a special election on a mill
levy proposition in a school district, the school board is the principal "contestee" and, accordingly,
must be named as a party and timely served to contest an election. 406 N.W.2d at 656.
529. 406 N.W.2d at 657; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01-38 (1974) (providing that an attempt to
commence an action is the equivalent to an actual commencement when the summons is delivered to
the sheriff in the county in which the defendant resides, with the intent that the summons will
actually be served). The plaintiffs asserted that their action was properly commenced since the
summonses and complaints were delivered to the sheriff on the fourteenth day with the intent that
they actually be served on the school board members. 406 N.W.2d at 657.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that statutes
limiting the time to bring an election contest are designed to speed
up the resolution of a contested election. 530 Furthermore, the court
noted that section 28-01-38 is a statute of general application 531 and
that when possible, statutory provisions which do not expressly
exclude each other from application must be considered together.
532
The court then determined that since the express language of the
election contest statutes and section 28-01-38 did not conflict, and
since section 28-01-38 did not violate the underlying purpose of
expediting an election contest, the statutes were to be construed
together and, thus, the continuation provisions were applicable.
533
Therefore, the supreme court held that under section 28-01-38, the
plaintiffs had timely delivered the papers to the sheriff's office with
a bona fide intent that they be served as soon as reasonably
possible. 534 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs' election




Thiele v. Security State Bank
In Thiele v. Security State Bank, 536 Thiele appealed from a partial
summary judgment dismissing his wrongful dishonor claim against
Security State Bank (Security) and its president and from an order
denying his motion to vacate the judgment.537 Between 1979 and
1984, Security had paid Thiele's overdrafts. 538 However, in July
1984, Security dishonored overdrafts in the amount of $510,693.33
530. 406 N.W.2d at 657; see, e.g., Soules v. Wolf, 65 N.D. 194, 199, 256 N.W. 757, 760 (1934)
(election contests policy is to compel prompt action).
531. 406 N.W.2d at 658; see, e.g., Citizens' State Bank v. Smeland, 48 N.D. 466, 469, 184
N.W. 987, 988 (1921) (construing predecessor statute).
532. 406 N.W.2d at 658 (citing United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439,
443 (N.D. 1965)).
533. Id. The court noted that while an aggravated application of the continuation provisions of S
28-01-38 would not be permitted, the possibility of such abuse did not warrant a refusal to apply the
statute to the present case. Id.
534. Id. at 659.
535. Id.
536. 393 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1986).
537. Thiele v. Security State Bank, 396 N.W.2d 295, 296 (N.D. 1986). Thiele appealed from
the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment contending that the district court reconsidered
the issues decided by the partial summary judgment when it granted his motion to amend the
complaint because the amended complaint superseded the partial summary judgment. Id. However,
the supreme court held that the amended complaint did not reinstate the issues decided by the
judgment since the district court had previously denied Thiele's motion to vacate and thereafter was
divested ofjurisdiction by the appeal from the partial summary judgment. Id. at 297.
538. Id. at 296. Security paid Thiele's overdrafts up to $50,000 without receiving assurances
from Thiele that deposits were forthcoming. Id. at 299. However, when the overdrafts totaled more
than $50,000 Security contacted Thiele and received assurances of deposits. Id.
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without giving Thiele written or verbal notice. 539  The
determinative issue on appeal was whether Thiele and Security had
an actual or implied agreement for Security to provide an unlimited
line of credit for the payment of Thiele's overdrafts without
receiving assurances of repayment.
540
The supreme court noted that pursuant to the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), a bank may charge an otherwise
properly payable item against a customer's account even though
that charge creates an overdraft.5 4 1 However, the court stated that
absent a contrary agreement, a bank is not obligated to pay an
overdraft or to give a depositor notice of a potential overdraft even
if it has done so in the past. 542 The supreme court then determined
that pursuant to the U.C.C., Security's practice of honoring
Thiele's overdrafts did not evidence an actual or implied contract
to do so in the future or to extend Thiele an unlimited line of
credit. 543 The court reasoned that the parties had previously
entered into a written account agreement which explicitly provided
that Security did not oblige itself to pay any future overdrafts
regardless of the frequency with which it may have done so in the
past. 54 4 Moreover, the court held that the prior course of conduct
between Security and Thiele did not constitute promissory estoppel
because that conduct did not evidence a promise to pay future
overdrafts. 545 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's
partial summary judgment.
546
Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke
In Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke, 547 Fenske Feed & Grain
Company (Fenske) appealed from a directed verdict in favor of the
Dakota Bank & Trust Company (Dakota). 548 Dakota possessed a
security interest in over 60,000 bushels of corn harvested by
539. Id. at 296.
540. Id. at 297.
541. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CooF § 41-04-28 (1983) (specifies when a bank may charge a
customer's account).
542. 396 N.W.2d at 298 (citing Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 131 Wis. 2d 389 ... , 388
N.W.2d 645, 648 (1986)).
543. Id. at 301.
544. Id. at 298.
545. Id. at 301. The court stated that before the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be invoked,
the promise or agreement must be clear, definite, and unambiguous as to its essential terms. Id.
(citing Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 357 (N.D. 1986)). Furthermore, the court
reasoned that Thiele could not have justifiably relied on Security's practice of paying his overdrafts
since Security's prior conduct did not rise to the level at which Thiele could assume that he could
write checks without monitoring the status ofhis bank account. Id.
546. Id. at 302.
547. 404 N.W.2d 438 (N.D. 1987).
548. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke, 404 N.W.2d 438, 438 (N.D. 1987).
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Brakke.5 49 Pursuant to an agreement with Dakota, Brakke was
permitted to take the secured corn to the Fenske elevator, where
Fenske was to sell the corn at the highest possible market price.
550
Upon delivery of the corn to Fenske, Brakke executed a Certificate
of Ownership disclosing that both Dakota and Farmers Home
Administration possessed a security interest in the corn.
551
Thereafter, Fenske marketed the corn and issued three checks on
behalf of Brakke. 552 However, two of the three checks failed to list
Dakota as a payee and, as a result, Dakota did not receive any
payments from Fenske or Brakke for the sale of Brakke's corn.
553
Consequently, Dakota brought a claim for conversion against
Fenske asserting that Dakota possessed a security interest in all
60,000 bushels of corn sold by Fenske and that Fenske was
"absolutely liable" for the face value of the checks. 55 4
At the trial court level, Fenske attempted to introduce
evidence that Brakke's corn was commingled with other corn of
which Dakota did not have a security interest. 555 However, the trial
court excluded Fenske's evidence regarding the commingling of the
corn and entered a directed verdict in favor of Dakota for the
amount of the checks which failed to list Dakota as a payee and for
Dakota's costs and disbursements. 556 Fenske appealed asserting
that since Dakota's actual interest in the corn was in dispute, a
question as to the damages existed and, thus, the district court
abused its discretion by excluding Fenske's evidence. 5
57
The supreme court noted that section 41-09-28(4) does not
specify that a grain merchant is absolutely liable if he or she fails to
name a secured party as payee on checks issued in payment of farm
549. Id. at 439. Brakke used the corn as collateral for a farm production loan given by Dakota in
1983. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S'41-09-28(4) (1983) (repealed 1985 N.D. Laws 1695) (providing
that before a merchant who sells farm products can issue a check to the owner, the merchant must
require the owner to execute a certificate of ownership).
552. 404 N.W.2d at 439.
553. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-09-28(4) (1983) (repealed 1985 N.D. Laws 1695) (requiring
farm products merchants to include all names of secured parties disclosed on the certificate of
ownership as payees on any check or draft issued for the farm products).
554. 404 N.W.2d at 439-40.
555. Id. at 440.
556. Id.
557. Id. On appeal, Fenske conceded liability in conversion for the value of the corn it sold in
which Dakota actually possessed a security interest. Id. However, Fenske asserted that not all of the
60,000 bushels of corn delivered by Brakke were composed of collateral in which Dakota had a
security interest. Id. at 440-41. Therefore, Fenske contended that it should be liable only for that
percentage of Dakota's interest in the corn actually converted. Id. at 441. In addition, Fenske
asserted that section 41-09-28(4) did not provide that an elevator was automatically strictly liable for
the face amount of every check issued in payment for a commodity that did not contain the name of
secured party as payee. Id. at 442.
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products. 558 Thus, the court stated that since section 41-09-28(4)
did not establish provisions for the recovery of a secured party's
property, other statutes and case law governed Dakota's
recovery.5 59 The court then recognized that pursuant to sections 32-
25-01 and 32-03-23 of the North Dakota Century Code, when the
grain of different owners is stored in an elevator, becomes
commingled, and is later converted, the owner of any part may
maintain an action against the wrongdoer for the recovery of
possession or the value of his or her contribution to the common
mass at the time of conversion. 560 Accordingly, the court held that
the district court abused its discretion by excluding Fenske's
evidence relating to the commingling of Brakke's corn, as this
evidence was relevant to the issue of damages.5 61 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the district court's directed verdict and
remanded the matter for a determination of Dakota's actual
damages. 
562
558. Id. at 444.
559. Id. at 442-43.
560. Id. at 443; N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-25-01 (1976) (providing who may bring an action for
conversion of grain by public warehouses); see also N.D. CENT. COOE 5 32-03-23 (1976)(damages for
conversion of personalty).
561. 404 N.W.2d at 444.
562. Id.
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